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LEGAL EFFECT OF CONTRACTS TO DEVISE OR 
BEQUEATH PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF THE 
PROMISOR: I* 
Bertel M. Spark.st 
Q UESTIONS involving the rights, duties, powers, privileges, and immunities of parties to contracts to devise or bequeath are fre-
quently raised prior to the death of the party promising to make th~ de-
vise or bequest. In essence the problem is one of analyzing the legal re-
lationships existing prior to the date set for performance. An analysis 
of these relationships is undertaken in this article. Vital questions con-
cerning the formation of such contracts and their enforcement after 
the promisor's death are considered only when they appear essential 
to the development of the main theme which concerns the contract's 
effect prior to the time when actual performance is possible. 
Interest Remaining in the Property Owner after He Has Made a Valid 
Contract to Devise or Bequeath His Property 
Contracts to make wills are probably less adequately understood 
by the parties to them than any other contracts known to the law. 
The vagueness of the layman's conception of this particular legal de-
vice is well illustrated by the ambiguous and indefinite promises con-
stituting the contracts. A contract to devise Blackacre for a consider-
ation of $8,000 payable immediately might he a reasonably definite 
contract/ hut promises to devise "Blackacre" are less common in the 
law than are promises to will "all my property," "all the property I 
may own at my death," "one-half of all my earthly goods," or some 
other entity represented by a phrase equally incapable of identifying 
any property at all at the time the contract is entered into. It is diffi-
"" This article is based upon a section of a thesis written in partial fulfillment of 
requirements for the S.J.D. degree at the University of Michigan Law School. 
t Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.-Ed. 
1 A contract even in these terms might leave some uncertainty as to when the will 
is to be made, the effect of failure to make the will, the effect of a subsequent inter vivos 
sale of Blackacre, the extent of restrictions imposed upon the promisor' s use of Blackacre, 
the extent to which Blackacre is liable for the debts of the promisor or of the promisee 
prior to the promisor's death, the application of rules as to lapse in the event the promisee 
predeceases the promisor, and many other questions that might arise. 
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cult to determine what effect the parties to such a contract intended 
the transaction to have upon the promisor' s future dealings with his 
property. The parties rarely express themselves upon this subject, and, 
as a matter of fact, it is not likely that they had any "intent" at all. The 
more plausible conclusion is that they didn't even think about the 
matter. But this fact, if it be the fact, does not relieve the courts of 
the responsibility of construing such contracts as come before them. 
So far as actual intent is concerned the promisor probably never 
even thought of the possibility that such a contract might restrict him 
in his relationship to his own property during his own life. When 
a husband and wife execute wills leaving their property to the survivor 
and make a contract that the survivor shall leave his or her property 
to an agreed beneficiary, when a man promises his prospective wife 
that he will devise or bequeath her one-half of his estate if she will 
marry him, or when a father contracts with his children that he will 
leave his estate to them in equal portions, it is doubtful if any one of 
these promisors gives very much conscious thought to the extent to 
which he might be restricting his own use or right of disposition of 
his property during his lifetime. Yet if some such restrictions are 
not presumed these promises tend to become almost illusory or at 
least lose much of the potency generally attributed to them by the 
courts. A situation might be supposed wherein A contracts that if he 
should happen to own any property at his death, that property would 
go to B, but that it is clearly and expressly understood that A is free 
to defeat B's expectations by disposing of his entire estate prior to his 
death. A's promise would probably be sufficient consideration to 
support a contract for there is a definite commitment that upon the 
happening of a named contingency B will get real value from his bar-
gain. Although the happening or non-happening of this contingency 
is entirely within the control of A, the only means by which A can 
defeat B's claim is by making an absolute inter vivos disposition of all 
his assets, a possible detriment to himself. While legal consideration 
can be found in such a promise, it should be clear that nothing so 
speculative and uncertain is contemplated by the parties to a serious 
contract for the making of a will. Should it be held that the promi-
sor is always left free to defeat the effect of his promise by completely 
and deliberately denuding himself of his assets immediately after en-
tering into the bargain it would seem that the contracts could serve 
very little purpose other than that of being either gambling devices 
or instruments of fraud and would be unworthy of legal protection. 
Where legal advice is possible it is highly important that a person 
about to agree to devise or bequeath his property be fully informed 
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of the probable consequences of such a contract. He should also have 
pointed out to him the possibility that a future change of circum-
stances might make such a contract undesirable. A party to such a 
contract should be made to understand clearly that the law does not 
permit a man to have his cake and eat it too. If he does enter into 
such a contract he should do so with a knowledge of the legal sig-
nificance which the law will attach to his act, and with a realization 
that a part of that legal significance might be the prevention of his 
making some future use or disposition of his property which might 
become highly desirable to him. That parties have often failed to 
consider these matters is demonstrated by the frequency with which 
they have tried to get from under the effects of the contracts once they 
have entered into them. To accomplish this result various means have 
been attempted, including inter vivas gifts, inter vivas sales, transfers 
with a reservation of a life estate, various types of trust arrangements, 
and others. Some of these schemes have achieved the desired pur-
pose and some of them haven't. It would seem that most of these 
unfortunate experiences could be avoided if the parties realized in 
advance the nature of the obligation the promisor assumed toward his 
promisee. 
One of the most frequent means employed by promisors to avoid 
the effect of their contracts to devise or bequeath has been that of inter 
vivas dispositions of property. There seems to be a vague notion that 
since the contract is one to make a will or not to revoke a will already 
made, the promise cannot affect an inter vivas disposition which leaves 
nothing in the estate of the promisor upon which the will can oper-
ate. 2 It has long been established that in cases of promises to devise 
specific real estate, any subsequent conveyance by the promisor which 
does not constitute the grantee a bona fide purchaser is ineffective as 
against one claiming under the contract.3 Such a contract may be 
2 This contention is frequently made where the contract is for all the property the 
promisor owns at death. Some courts have been misled by the apparent logic of such an 
argument and seem to have held that there is no restriction placed upon inter vivos trans-
fers. Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 269 N.W. 883 (1936). Others have construed 
the contract as creating more substantial rights in the promisee but have experienced diffi-
culty avoiding the effect of an erroneous view that the contract was for a will rather than 
for property. This needless struggle in mental gymnastics has sometimes led to the strained 
construction of an inter vivos transfer of property as a change in a will. Thus, where there 
was a contract not to change a will it was reasoned that a conveyance of the property was 
such a change because it took the property out of the will. McCormick v. McRae, 11 
U.C.Q.B. 187 (1854). Since a will has no effect until the death of the testator it is diffi-
cult to see how property could go "into" the will prior to that time, and it is even more 
difficult to see how anything could be taken out of the will before it went into it. 
3 Stone v. Lacy, 242 Ala. 393, 6 S. (2d) 481 (1942); Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Cal. 336, 
184 P. 854 (1919); Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482, ll6 N.W. 468 (1908); Kastell 
v. Hillman, 53 N.J. Eq. 49, 30 A. 535 (1894); Young v. Young, 45 N.J. Eq. 27, 16 X. 
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considered analogous to a contract to sell, the time for performance 
being the death of the promisor, and little difficulty will be experi-
enced in developing a theory for the remedy granted. Not only is 
the promisor prevented from disposing of the property, but he is with-
out power to mortgage more than his life interest,4 and is not privi-
leged in destroying or encumbering the property.5 He is free during 
his lifetime to lease the property to the promisee, 6 and, of course may 
create an absolute interest in a bona fide purchaser.7 The contract 
then seems to be one that the promisor will do such acts as are neces-
sary to transmit the property to the promisor at his death, and will do 
nothing to interfere with or render impossible that transmission. 
In the event of a contract to bequeath specific non-unique chattels 
if the promisor makes an inter vivas disposition of the property the 
promisee has a cause of action against the promisor' s estate for their 
value.8 
In a contract to devise or bequeath all or a fractional part of one's 
estate, no specific property being encompassed by the contract, a more 
921 (1889); Erwin v. Erwin, 17 N.Y.S. 442 (1892), affd. 139 N.Y. 616, 35 N.E. 204 
(1893); Ankeny v. Lieuallen, 169 Ore. 206, 113 P. (2d) 1113 (1941), affd. on rehearing, 
169 Ore. 222, 127 P. (2d) 735 (1942); McCullom v. Mackrell, 13 S.D. 262, 83 N.W. 
25~ (1900); McCormick v. McRae, 11 U.C.Q.B. 187 (1854). 
Contra: A recent West Virginia case contains dicta to the effect that the promisor is 
free to convey the Teal estate any time prior to his death and that if he does convey, the 
promisee's only remedy ·is an action against the estate for damages. This is unsound unless 
it is also assumed that the transferee is a bona fide purchaser. The confused reasoning 
indulged in by the court is demonstrated by its apparent feeling that the rights of the 
promisee were testamentary rather than contractual. If this were actually the case why 
should even an action for damages be permitted? See Hannah v. Beasley, 132 W.Va. 814 
at 823-824, 53 S.E. (2d) 729 (1949). 
Where the promisor has left a will in conformity with the contract and the promisee 
has given consideration without notice of any prior contracts or conveyances by the promisor 
at least two courts have taken the position· that the promisee is himself a bona fide pur-
chaser and will take priority over a prior grantee or promisee, Larkins v. Howard, 252 Ala. 
9, 39 S. 224 (1949); Andrews v. Lary, (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) 224 S.W. (2d) 770. 
That such a promisee has given value and is without notice is clear. The theory of the 
court in each case was that the requirement of legal title was satisfied by the will. The 
reasoning applied is rather artificial since the rights asserted are contractual rath~ than 
testamentary and if it is recognized that the will is essential to the promisee's right it must 
be admitted that the property was removed from the promisor's estate prior to the will's 
effective date. If the pwmisees had been regarded as contracting vendees their rights could 
have been disposed of on a simple question of priorities without the necessity of classifying 
them as bona fide purchasers, and. in each instance the result would have been the same 
as that reached by the court. 
4Ankeny v. Lieuallen, 169 Ore. 206, 113 P. (2d) 1113 (1941), affd. on rehearing, 
169 Ore. 222, 127 P. (2d) 735 (1942). 
5 Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 28 S.E. (2d) 255 (1943); Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 
483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889). 
s Brock v. Noecker, 66 N.I:). 567, 267 N.W. 656 (1936). 
7 Androscoggin County Savings Bank v. Tracy, 115 Me. 433, 99 A. 257 (1916) 
(promisee was permitted the benefit of his contract by tracing the proceeds of the sale into 
the hands of the promisor). 
s Rags_dale v. Achuff, 324 Mo. 1159, ~7 S.W. (2d) 6 (1930). 
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difficult problem arises. In such cases it is clear that it was not within 
the contemplation of the parties that the estate would be kept in exactly 
the same form as it existed when the contract was made. It is equally 
clear that if the parties were entering into a serious bargain, it was 
not contemplated that the promisor would have the privilege of de-
liberately defeating the promisee' s prospects by arranging his affairs so 
that there would be nothing in his estate at his death.9 Wherever it 
is at all possible, the courts have construed these inter vivas disposi-
tions as testamentary in character and, therefore, in violation of the 
promisee's interest.1° For this purpose an absolute conveyance with 
a reservation of a life interest in the grantor is held testamentary.11 • 
Even though an irrevocable trust is created and the property conveyed 
to a trustee to be held for the benefit of the grantor for life, remainder 
to some other persons, the transaction has been treated as testamentary 
for the purpose of construing the rights of the promisee under a prior 
contract to leave all or a proportionate part of the estate by will.12 
The same result is reached where the transfer is absolute but the 
transferee agrees to pay the transferor an annuity for life.13 The 
theory of these cases has been that a contract to leave all or a pro-
portionate part of one's estate at death does not restrict the promisor 
in his manner of disposition before death, but that any disposition 
which preserves to the promisor the beneficial interest during his life 
will be considered a disposition at death and therefore ineffective as 
to persons claiming through the contract. In reaching this result these 
cases have originated a special definition of a testamentary disposition 
applicable to this particular situation only. It is difficult to see how 
the mere fact of reserving a life estate in the grantor, whether it be 
a legal life estate or a mere equitable estate through a trust mech-
anism, can be said to make the transaction testamentary. There is 
nothing testamentary about a present conveyance, provided it is ab-
solute and irrevocable, even though a life interest is reserved in the 
9 But see Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 269 N.W. 883 (1936). 
10 Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 35, 138 P. 728 (1914); DeJong v. Huyser, 233 
Iowa 1315, 11 N.W. (2d) 566 (1943); Sample v. Butler University, 211 Ind. 122, 4 
N.E. (2d) 545 (1936), modified 211 Ind. 139, 5 N.E. (2d) 888 (1937); Logan v. Wien· 
holt, 7 Bligh N.S. 1, 5 Eng. Rep. 674 (1833); Fortescue v. Hennah, 19 Ves. Jr. 67, 34 
Eng. Rep. 443 (1812); Keays v. Gilmore, 8 Ir. Rep. (Eq.) 290 (1873). 
11 Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 35, 138 P. 728 (1914); DeJong v. Huyser, 233 
Iowa 1315, 11 N.W. (2d) 566 (1943); Fortescue v. Hennah, 19 Ves. Jr. 67, 34 Eng. Rep. 
443 (1812). 
12Farmers Nat. Bank of Danville v. Young, 297 Ky. 95, 179 S.W. (2d) 229 (1944); 
Logan v. Wienholt, 7 Bligh N.S. 1, 5 Eng. Rep. 674 (1833). In this connection it has 
also been held that a tentative (savings bank) trust is testamentacy in character. In re 
Nelson's Will, 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 427 (1951). 
1s Sample v. Butler University, 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.E. (2d) 545 (1936), modified 211 
Ind. 139, 5 N.E. (2d) 888 (1937). 
6 MmmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
grantor, and no one would argue that such a conveyance would have 
to be executed as a will. Although some cases can be found which 
seem to base their actual decision on the testamentary theory,14 it is 
rather apparent that the courts using language to this effect are usually 
doing nothing more than holding that the promisor cannot dispose 
of his property in a manner which would constitute bad faith tow~rd 
the promisee, and that the reservation of a life interest to himself is 
evidence of bad faith. 
Something more than the testamentary disposition theory is clearly 
necessary to any logical analysis of the cases or any accurate descrip-
tion of the promisor' s obligations toward his promisee. It was estab-
lished at an early date that if the promisor of a contract to will a frac-
tional part of all the property he may own at his death makes an 
absolute inter vivos transfer, retaining no interest whatever to him-
self, for the very purpose of avoiding the effect of the contract the 
transfer will be set aside in cases where the transferees are mere vol-
unteers.15 Even though the promisor did not bind any particular 
property and did not promise that there would be anything at all in 
his estate at his death, he was deprived by the contract of the privilege 
of disposing of his estate for the purpose of preventing the property 
from passing to the promisee.16 No dissent from this view has been 
found where the intent of the promisor is clear.17 Here again the 
courts have sometimes clung to the view that the promisor is free to 
make any disposition that is not testamentary, but that a disposition 
for the purpose of avoiding the contract is in effect testamentary.18 
There is no more reason for calling this a testamentary disposition 
than there is for saying that the absolute conveyance with a reserva-
tion of a life interest is testamentary. It is merely the court's effort 
to evade the responsibility of attempting to define the interest one has 
in his property after he has made a contract to devise his estate in 
a particular manner, but has not contracted that any specific property 
14 Keays v. Gilmore, 8 Ir. Rep. (Eq.) 290 (1873). 
15 Gregor v. Kemp, 3 Swanst. 404n. (1722) reported in note to Gordon v. Gordon, 
3 Swanst. 400 at 404, 36 Eng. Rep. 910 at 926. 
16 In Gregor v. Kemp, id. at 406n., the Lord Chancellor was of the opinion that the 
promiser was "not restrained from disposing of her estate any way in her lifetime, and 
had a full power over it, but with this single exception, -viz. she was restrained from 
making a distribution on purpose to defeat the covenant .••• " 
17Whitney v. Hay, 181 U.S. 77, 21 S.Ct. 537 (1901); Whiton v. Whiton, 179 ill. 
32, 53 N.E. 722 (1899) (gift of all of one's property, thus becoming completely depend-
ent upon the transferee held to be sufficient evidence of such intent); Hatcher v. Sawyer, 
243 Iowa 858, 52 N.W. (2d) 490 (1952); Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352, 125 
N.W. 871 (1910) (evidence of intent demonstrated by the promiser's open repudiation of 
the contract); Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 124 N.E. 37 (1919); Huffine v. Lincoln, 
52 Mont. 585, 160 P. 820 (1916) (intention openly declared by the promiser). 
1s Whiton v. Whiton, 179 ill. 32 at 54, 53 N.E. 722 (1899). 
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will be included in his estate. In these cases where there is an in-
tent to deprive the promisee of his prospects under the contracts the 
courts have often talked of the fraud of the promisor.19 Discussions 
of fraud in this respect are misleading since a mere breach of a con-
tract, however intentional, is not fraud. 
There are also many situations where even though there is no 
evidence of actual intent on the part of the promisor to defeat the 
contractual rights, inter vivos conveyances are set aside because they 
are in substantial violation of the agreement. A gift made by the 
promisor during his lifetime may be so out of proportion to the size 
of his estate as to impeach the integrity of the agreement, and it is 
in this group of cases, where no actual intent to defeat the rights of 
the promisee is shown and where not even a perverted theory of testa-
mentary disposition can be utilized, that the actual interest remaining 
in the promisor can best be defined. It is clearly inequitable to per-
mit one to contract to make a will leaving his entire estate to a named 
person at death and then defeat the effect of the will by making an 
inter vivos gift of all his property, thus leaving nothing upon which 
his will made in compliance with the contract can operate. Such 
a transfer, if the property is still in the hands of a mere volunteer, 
is ineffective so far as defeating the contractual rights is concerned.20 
The same result is reached where the inter vivos transfer consists of 
not all, but a substantial portion of the promisor's estate.21 One 
owning a life estate in certain property and the fee in other property, 
but under a contractual duty to will his entire estate to the remainder-
man, cannot make a gratuitous transfer of all the property in which 
he owns a fee. 22 A contract to leave a child an equal portion with 
other children is violated by inter vivos gifts in substantial amounts 
to the other children. 23 
In spite of all these restraints the promisor is still not without the 
19Whiton v. Whiton, 179 III. 32 at 54, 53 N.E. 722 (1899); Huffine v. Lincoln, 52 
Mont. 585 at 593, 160 P. 820 (1916). 
20 Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900). 
21 Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. (2d) 568 (1945); Riddell v. 
Riddell, 146 La. 37, 83 S. 369 (1919); Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108, 176 S.W. 942 
(1915); Quinn v. Quinn, 5 S.D. 328, 58 N.W. 808 (1894); Swingley v. Daniels, 123 
Wash. 409, 212 P. 729 (1923). 
22Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 S.E. 749 (1918). 
23 Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915); Willis v. Black, 4 
Russ. 170, 38 Eng. Rep. 769 (1828), reversing Willis v. Black, 1 Sim. & St. 525, 57 
Eng. Rep. 208 (1824). 
The reasoning here is that the promise, like the agreement for a fractional part, is a 
promise to make a devise or bequest the value of which will depend largely upon the size 
of the promisor's estate at death. Any act of the promisor which reduces the size of the 
estate in a manner demonstrative of lack of good faith with the promisee is in violation of 
the agreement. Logan v. Wienholt, 7 Bligh N.S. 1, 5 Eng. Rep. 674 (1833). 
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privilege of reasonable use of his property, nor is he hampered in 
conveying or even giving it away so long as the gifts are reasonable 
and made in good faith,24 and certainly he may dispose of the entire 
estate for his own maintenance.25 After making a contract to will all 
of one's estate to a named person, the promisor may even validly con-
tract with a third person to devise a specific tract of land included in 
the estate in return for support and maintenance of the promisor for 
life.26 
It has already been seen that one cannot dispose of any of his 
estate for the specific purpose of avoiding the contractual obligation. 
But assuming that no such purpose exists he can convey a reason-
able amount as he chooses, by gift or otheFWise. The important ques-
tion then is that of determining where the line is to be drawn. As 
is often the situation when dealing with judicial questions, it is impos-
sible to identify that line in such terms as will assure certainty of 
result in all cases, but the lack of certainty need be no more pro-
nounced here than elsewhere in the legal system. A possible answer 
to the problem has been suggested in Dickinson 11. Seaman,27 a case 
involving an antenuptial contract by which the husband agreed to de-
vise and bequeath his entire estate to the wife's daughter by a previous 
marriage. The size of the husband's estate was not indicated in the 
opinion except that he was a man of means and died possessed of 
considerable wealth. Prior to his death he assigned an insurance pol-
icy in the amount of $10,000 to his brothers and sisters. In holding 
the assignment valid the court stated: 
''It is asked, however, whether the decedent could give away 
all his property to his own relatives, and thus defea~ the ante-
nuptial contract altogether. And, assuming that he could not 
do this because it would be unreasonable, it is further asked 
where the line is to be drawn between the power to give away 
all and to give away nothing. That line is to be drawn where 
the courts always draw it when they can, along the boundary of 
good faith. . . . Reasonable gifts were impliedly authorized. Un-
24, Noble v. Metcalf, 157 Ala. 295, 47 S. 1007 (1908); Ohms v. Church of the 
Nazarene, 64 Idaho 262, 130 P. (2d) 679 (1942); National Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 141 
Kan. 903, 44 P. (2d) 269 (1935); Fourth Nat. Bank v. First Presbyterian Church, 134 
Kan. 643, 7 P. (2d) 81 (1932); Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1, 79 S.W. (2d) 35(} (1935); 
Matter of Salisbury, 242 App. Div. 645, 272 N.Y.S. 135, affd. 265 N.Y. 536, 193 N.E. 
308 (1934); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915); Dickinson v. 
Seaman, 193 N.Y. 18, 85 N.E. 818 (1908). 
25 See Price v. Aylor, 258 Ky. 1 at 4, 79 S.W. (2d) 350 (1935). 
26 Smith v. McHenry, 111 Kan. 659, 207 P. 1108 (1922). 
21193 N.Y. 18, 85 N.E. 818 (1908). 
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reasonable gifts were not, even if made without .actual intent to 
defraud."28 
9 
The greatest difficulty with the above statement is its apparent em-
phasis upon good faith as the deciding factor. If it was intended 
that the test of reasonableness be applied as an independent basis for 
decision in cases where no question of good faith was involved, then 
the solution offered is fairly workable, but if reasonableness was in-
tended as merely an element in the determination of good or bad faith, 
then the statement is extremely inadequate. While it seems clear 
that a transfer made in bad faith will not be permitted to defeat the 
rights of a promisee of a contract to devise or bequeath, it is equally 
clear that bad faith is merely one of a number of elements any one of 
which will produce the same result. It is not difficult to imagine a 
situation where a promisor might give away such large quantities of 
his estate that the gifts would be set aside even though they were made 
in perfectly good faith. This very situation is illustrated by Skinner 
11. Rasche,29 where an inter vivas transfer made in the utmost of good 
faith was insufficient to defeat the rights under the contract. In that 
case the promisor died believing that the transfer made by him would 
result in placing title in the beneficiary of the contract. Although 
he was mistaken as to the legal consequences of his act, the court set 
aside his inter vivas transfer and gave the third party beneficiary the 
property. 
Not only the size of the gift but also its purpose may be considered 
in determining its reasonableness. This element was particularly 
prominent in Fourth National Bank 11. First Presbyterian Church30 
where a husband and wife executed wills by which each of them left 
the other his or her entire estate for life, remainder to an agreed 
charity, and contracted with each other not to change their wills. Af-
ter the wife died and the husband took possession of her property the 
combined estates amounted to about $650,000. A gift of $100,000 
by the husband for the purpose of erecting a memorial to his wife 
was held to be a reasonable gift. The court emphasized the purpose 
of the gift in determining the validity of the transaction and seemed 
to indicate that a gift of this amount for a less worthy purpose might 
have been invalidated. 
28 Dickinson v. Seaman, 193 N.Y. 18 at 24, 85 N.E. 818 (1908). 
29 165 Ky. 108, 176 S.W. 942 (1915). There was some reasoning in the case to 
the effect that this was a testamentaiy gift because the property was impressed with a trust. 
Just how the existence of such a trust, i£ it did exist, would make the gift testamentaiy is 
not easy to understand. 
so 134 Kan. 643, 7 P. (2d) 81 (1932). 
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In Ohms v. Church of the Nazarene31 it was held that where the 
contract is made between a husband and wife by which the survivor 
of them is obligated to leave his or her estate to a third party, their 
relationship with the third party as well as the purpose of the gift 
may be considered in determining the reasonableness of inter vivos 
gifts made by the survivor. According to the terms of the contract 
the entire estate of the survivor was to go to the husband's children 
by a former marriage. The husband died first. Thereafter the wife 
made a gift of more than half the estate to a charity. In holding this 
gift valid the court relied upon the fact that the husband's children 
had been separated from him for several years, had visited him very 
little even in his last days, and that the charity had contributed much 
to the welfare of the wife. This is probably as far as any court has 
gone in sustaining a gift of this kind. 
There is in the contract to will all or a fractional part of the prop-
erty one may own at death a contract not creating any particular debt 
of any kind and not applicable to any specific property, and yet it 
does have the effect of restricting the owner in his power over his 
assets. It appears that the promisor who is fabulously wealthy when 
he enters into such a contract but is later reduced to poverty through 
imprudent or unwise investments violates no duty to the promisee.32 
If the contracts are interpreted literally they usually would pertain 
to only such property as the promisor happened to possess at his death, 
imposing upon him no obligation to possess any at that time and 
leaving him perfectly free to arrange his affairs so that he would not 
have any. The courts have taken a more practical approach by doing 
what might be called the raising of a presumption that the promisor 
actually promised something more, though he was not very articulate 
in expressing the terms of the promise, and have held that the con-
tract did place some restrictions upon him. The tendency of the 
courts while reaching this result to describe the disposition made by 
the derelict promisor as testamentary is nothing more than an effort to 
bring the relief given within the express terms of the contract. If the 
disposition is testamentary it is in violation of the express agreement 
and involves no problem in interpretation or construction. The effort 
to avoid interpretation and construction problems when there has been 
an inter vivos transfer has often resulted in describing as testamentary 
that which is definitely not testamentary according to any accepted 
meaning of that word. 
31 64 Idaho 262, 130 P. (2d) 679 (1942). 
32 See Fourth Nat. Bank v. First Presbyterian Church, 134 Kan. 643 at 648-649, 7 
P. (2d) 81 (1932). 
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The argument that an inter vivas transfer by the prornisor is valid 
unless it is made with intent to deprive the prornisee of his gift is 
equally without merit. It was observed above that the size of the gifts 
may be so out of proportion to the size of the promisor' s estate that 
the gifts will be set aside regardless of any intent of the promisor. 
Apparently misled by the language used by the courts in situations 
where the intent is clearly present, a few cases can be found which 
appear to require the positive showing of an actual intent of the prom-
isor to defeat the contract.33 Such a theory is not supported by the 
decisions based on the reasonableness of the size of the gift, and is 
completely repudiated by a consideration of cases such as Skinner v. 
Rasche34 where the opposite intent was affirmatively shown. 
Thus it becomes necessary to fall back upon the question of what 
is reasonable under the facts of the particular case to determine the 
· extent to which the promisor can dispose of his property. The reason-
ableness required here can best be defined in terms of what one would 
do in the normal course of his affairs. Coupled with this requirement 
there is the added restriction that he cannot make gifts which would 
substantially alter his estate or which would not likely be made by one 
intending to permit his estate to continue as a going concern. He is . 
free to mortgage the assets in the regular course of business85 or to 
invest and reinvest any or all of his property36 and is not responsible 
for losses that might result.37 He has a marketable title to any or all 
of his assets.38 He is free to make gifts which would normally be 
made by one of his station in life, 39 and may make extraordinary gifts 
for particularly meritorious purposes40 or where it appears that the 
contract was for the benefit of a third party beneficiary in whom the 
prornisee had but little more than an incidental interest and whose 
moral claim to the property is very slight. 41 He cannot give his prop-
erty away for the purpose of avoiding his obligation under the con-
ss Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472, 26 N.E. 890 (1891); Schauer v. Schauer, 43 N.M. 
209, 89 P. (2d) 521 (1939). 
34 165 Ky. 108, i76 S.W. 942 (1915), cited supra note 29. 
85National Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 141 Kan. 903, 44 P. (2d) 269 (1935). 
36 Noble v. Metcalf, 157 Ala. 295, 47 S. 1007 (1908). 
87 See Fourth Nat. Bank v. First Presbyterian Church, 134 Kan. 643 at 648-649, 7 
P. (2d) 81 (1932); Webster & Milford's Case, 2 Eq. Cas. Ahr. 362 at 363, 22 Eng. Rep. 
308 (1708). 
as Needham v. Kirkman, 3 Barn. & Ald. 531, 106 Eng. Rep. 755 (1820). 
89 Dickinson v. Seaman, 193 N.Y. 18, 85 N.E. 818 (1908). 
40 Fourth Nat. Bank v. First Presbyterian Church, 134 Kan. 643, 7 P. (2d) 81 (1932). 
41 Ohms v. Church of the Nazarene, 64 Idaho 262, 130 P. (2d) 679 (1942) (also 
considered the meritorious nature of the gift). 
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tract,42 nor may he, regardless of intent, make substantial gifts of a 
nature that would defeat the reasonably foreseeable economic value 
anticipated by the promisee. 43 The fact that this standard is not fixed 
or definite should not hinder a court of equity in its application. It 
is a standard of reasonableness well known to equity jurisprudence. 
A restriction upon the promisor' s use and disposition of his prop-
erty even though he did not expressly contract to have, and is not 
required to have, any property at his death is nothing novel or anom-
alous in the law. It is a restriction demanded by good faith and fair 
dealing and without which the contract ceases to have meaning. If 
analogy is needed it can be easily found. A servant, when he enters 
into a contract of employment, impliedly agrees that he will not use 
or disclose to his master's detriment trade secrets which he learns in 
the course of his employment.44 A sale of good will, without any 
express agreement to refrain from competition, carries with it an im-
plied promise not to compete. 45 Property disposed of by the exercise 
of a general power of appointment may be appropriated to pay the 
debts of the appointor.46 All these are equitable doctrines engrafted 
on express contracts or written instruments because consonant with 
. fundamental principles of justice. To hold that a contract to make 
a devise or bequest, the amount of which is to be determined by the 
size of the promisor's estate at death, did not include an implied agree-
ment for reasonable use by the promisor would be an imputation of 
vanity to the entire transaction. 
It follows from what has already been said that a conveyance pro-
cured by a third person for the purpose of defeating the effect of the 
contract47 or any conveyance resulting from undue influence48 can-
not deprive the promisee of his contractual rights, and the promisee 
42Whiton v. Whiton, 179 lli. 32, 53 N.E. 722 (1899); Chantl:tnd v. Sherman, 148 
Iowa 352, 125 N.W. 871 (1910); Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 124 N.E. 37 (1919); 
Huffine v. Lincoln, 52 Mont. 585, 160 P. 820 (1916); Gregor v. Kemp, 3 Swanst. 404, 
note, 36 Eng. Rep. 926 (1722). 
43 Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. (2d) 568 (1945); Riddell v. 
Riddell, 146 La. 37, 83 S. 369 (1919); Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108, 176 S.W. 942 
(1915); Quinn v. Quinn, 5 S.D. 328, 58 N.W. 808 (1894); Swingley v. Daniels, 123 
Wash. 409, 212 P. 729 (1923). 
44 Belmont Laboratories v. Heist, 300 Pa. 542, 151 A. 15 (1930), modified 303 Pa. 
7, 154 A. 19 (1931); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 29 R.I. 399, 71 A. 802 (1909). 
45 Foss v. Roby, 195 Mass. 292, 81 N.E. 199 (1907); Old Comer Book Store v. 
Upham, 194 Mass. IOI, 80 N.E. 228 (1907). 
46 Jackson v. Franklin, 179 Ga. 840, 177 S.E. 731 (1934); Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 
Mass. 200 (1879); Thompson v. Towne, 2 Vern. 319, 23 Eng. Rep. 806 (1694). 
47 Campbell v. Brown, 268 App. Div. 324, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 310 (1944). 
48 McGuire v. McGuire, 74 Ky. (II Bush) 142 (1874); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 
72 Mich. 76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888); Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 160 N.Y.S. 624 
(1916). 
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is the proper party to bring the appropriate action in the event such 
a conveyance has been made.49 
Although the cases heretofore considered have usually involved 
gifts, it must not be assumed that the existence of a consideration is 
within itself sufficient to validate the transfer of property by one who 
has contracted to leave his entire estate by will. If the transferee has 
knowledge of the prior contract he cannot be a bona fide purchaser 
and will be in no better position than if he had taken as a mere 
donee.150 It is also true that the consideration may be so out of pro-
portion to the value of the property transferred151 or the nature of the 
consideration may so tend to indicate an intent to avoid the contract:52 
that the good faith of the transaction will be impeached. 
The dearth of cases dealing directly with the promisor' s privilege 
of committing waste during his lifetime makes it necessary that most 
of the conclusions concerning this question be drawn from the impli-
cations found in the cases involving restraints upon his power of dis-
position. Since his power of disposition is restricted to transfers made 
in good faith and for reasonable purposes, it would seem that his 
privilege of use and enjoyment would most certainly not include the 
privilege of deliberately or wantonly wasting or destroying the prop-
erty. In Noble 11. Metcalf3 after the promisor had conveyed certain 
real estate the promi~ee brought his bill in equity to have himself 
declared a remainderman after a life estate and to enjoin the commis-
sion of waste. It was found that the transfer was reasonable and in 
good faith and, therefore, not in violation of the contract. Under such 
circumstances the denial of the relief sought cannot be interpreted as 
having any effect upon the question of the promisee's right to enjoin 
the commission of waste. An injunction has been granted against 
waste where the contract concerned specific property,54 and no reason 
appears why the same relief should not be available even though spe-
cific property was not concerned if unreasonable or wanton waste were 
threatened. 
49 McGuire v. McGuire, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 142 (1874); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 
72 Mich. 76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888); Campbell v. Brown, 268 App. Div. 324, 51 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 310 (1944); Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 160 N.Y.S. 624 (1916). 
150Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (1 Beasley) 142 (1858). 
151 Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1929). 
152 Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (1 Beasley) 142 (1858). The consideration 
here was a bond conditioned upon the grantee's boarding, maintaining, and providing for 
the promiser and his wife for their lives. The grantee also had knowledge of the prior 
contract, and, therefore, was not a bona fide purchaser. 
!is 157 Ala. 295, 47 S. 1007 (1908). 
154 Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 28 S.E. (2d) 255 (1943). 
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Although the promisor cannot give his property away in unreason-
able amounts or even sell it to persons having notice of the prior con-
tract, his power to give good title to a bona fide purchaser is ap-
parently unquestioned.rm This point is emphasized in all the cases 
involving the inter vivos transfers of the promisor, and it seems that 
a failure to allege that the transferee is not a bona fide purchaser is 
fatal to recoverf'6 even under circumstances where it is difficult to 
see how he could reasonably be more than a mere volunteer.57 Where 
the trial court fails to make any findings on the question of good faith 
it is proper on appeal to remand the case for a reconsideration and 
a factual determination of that issue.58 
In any legal relationship where rights of creditors intervene it can 
be stated as axiomatic that if there have been no fraudulent convey-
ances a creditor can enforce his claim against the assets of his debtor 
only. In the e"\Tent it becomes necessary for him to levy upon any 
property of the debtor the levy cannot extent any further than the 
interest of the debtor in that property. If the debtor has in good faith 
lawfully disposed of any rights with regard to that property, those 
rights if in the hands of bona fide purchasers cannot be affected by 
a judgment sale of the debtor's property. The question then sug-
gested is, what interest, if any, has the promisor of a contract to make 
a will put beyond the reach of his creditors? Stated more in terms of 
the creditor seeking to enforce his judgment, the question would be, 
after one has made a contract to make a will, what interest in his 
property is still undisposed of and still available for the payment of 
his debts? 
In the case of specific property it would seem that the contract is 
one that the promisee will receive the property concerned at the death 
of the promisor. Since he has parted with any interest extending be-
yond his life, it is difficult to see how his creditors could secure the 
benefit of any value beyond that date. This result was reached in 
Ankeny '!7. Lieuallen59 where the promisor had secured his debt by 
giving his creditor a mortgage on the property subject to the contract, 
the mortgagee having full knowledge of the agreement. In foreclo-
sure proceedings it was held that the mortgage was ineffective as to 
anything more than an estate for the life of the promisor. 
55 Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 Mo. App. 18 (1892). 
56 Stone v. Lacy, 242 Ala. 393, 6 S. (2d) 481 (1942). 
57Ryan v. Boston Letter Carriers' Mutual Benefit Association, 222 Mass. 237, 110 
N.E. 281 (1915). 
58 Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 .N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915). 
59 169 Ore. 206, 113 P. (2d) 1113 (1941), affd. on rehearing, 169 Ore. 222, 127 
P. (2d) 735 (1942). 
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In the case of a contract to will all or a fractional part of the estate 
one may own at death an entirely different situation exists. Here the 
promisee has no claim to any specific property and it is not anticipated 
that the promisor will be restricted in the use of his property in his 
normal business affairs or for his own wants, needs, or convenience. 
This would certainly be sufficient to render his property liable for 
bona fide debts to the same extent and in the same manner as if no 
contract existed. In National Life Insurance Co. v. Watson60 one 
under a contract to will all his estate in a certain manner gave a mort-
gage on certain property as security for a debt. When foreclosure 
proceedings were instituted the beneficiaries of the contract came in 
to defend the action and claimed an interest in the property. The 
court very properly held that since the promisor had a right to use 
or dispose of the property for his own benefit, it was certainly liable 
for his debts, and that since it was liable for his debts it was subject 
to mortgage by him. 61 The soundness of the result reached is so 
obvious that the question has rarely been before the courts. 
Of course it is assumed that the debt concerned is a bona fide debt 
incurred in real business transactions. It would seem that the same 
requirements as to reasonableness and good faith which apply to trans-
fers of property by the promisor would be equally applicable to the 
creation of a debt by him. Although no case has been found directly 
in point it is very unlikely that an artificial debt deliberately created 
for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the contract would be recog-
nized even though it might be supported by legal consideration. Ac-
tual transfers by the promisor have been set aside on the ground that 
the consideration received was grossly out of proportion to the value 
of the property transferred,62 and no reason appears why the same rule 
should not apply if the promisor should create a debt for a nominal 
or insignificant consideration.63 
60 141 Kan. 903, 44 P. (2d) 269 (1935). 
61 "Certainly he had a right to borrow the $2,000 sued for in this action. And the 
judgment creditor could certainly have subjected this particular 100 acres to execution sale 
to the satisfaction of its judgment without a mortgage lien thereon •••• " National Life 
Ins. Co. v. Watson, 141 Kan. 903 at 905, 44 P. (2d) 269 (1935). 
62 Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1929). 
63 See also Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N.Y.S. 8 (1935) and Phillip v. 
Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 160 N.Y.S. 624 (1916), where mortgages given by the promiser 
without consideration were denied enforcement. The cases, however, are not too helpful in 
this connection in view of the fact that there is some doubt as to whether or not a mort-
gage as a gift is valid in any event. It seems clear that a mortgage need not be supported 
by consideration, and this has become the basis for the positive statement by some writers 
that a mortgage is a proper subject of a gift by the mortgagor. WALSH, MORTGAGES §14 
(1934). However, the fact that a mortgage given to support an obligation is enforceable 
only to the extent that the obligation is enforceable has led others to express doubts as to 
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Interest of the Promisee Prior to the Death of the Promisor 
An analysis of the extent to which a contract to devise or bequeath 
restricts an owner of property in dealing with his assets during his 
lifetime is by no means a complete solution to the problems that are 
likely to arise before his death. By the very terms of the contract the 
promisee was to receive the property at the death of the promisor. 
He was given no rights of beneficial enjoyment or of control prior to 
that time. It was contemplated that he would receive the property 
through the promisor' s will, but a will has no effect until the death 
of the testator. While struggling with this usually unexpressed view 
that the will is somehow a necessary part of the machinery by which 
the promisee receives the property, and often failing to define the in-
terests created by the contract itself, the courts have experienced con-
siderable difficulty in developing a theory for the granting of relief to 
the promisee prior to the time set for the performance of the agree-
ment. 
Little imagination is necessary to suppose many situations in which 
relief of some kind prior to the death of the promisor is absolutely 
essential if the promisee' s interests are to be protected. If the promisee 
is forced to sit quietly by while the promisor squanders the property, 
makes huge gifts, commits waste, executes mortgages, or performs many 
other acts inconsistent with the contract, the result will often be that 
by the time the property is to go over to the promisee, it will be non-
existent or in the hands of bona fide purchasers. Some relief against 
situations of this nature is essential if vitality is to be given to this 
type of contract. 
Probably the simplest type of relief against these improper acts 
of the promisor is to hold that they relieve the promisee of his ob-
ligation to perform his part of the hargain. In the case of Eaton -v. 
Eaton64 an antenuptial contract was made whereby the husband agreed 
to leave one-fourth of his estate to his wife, and the wife agreed to 
accept this amount in full satisfaction of her distributive share and 
not contest the will. Prior to his death the husband made large gifts 
to his children by a prior marriage with a view to avoiding the effect 
of the antenuptial contract. He died leaving his widow one-fourth 
of his greatly reduced estate. It was held that the wife was relieved 
of her obligation not to contest the will. 
whether or not a mortgage as an actual gift and unconnected with any obligation of any 
kind would be of any effect. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §1401 (1939). See 
also 4 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY §16.67 (1952). 
64 233 Mass. 351, 124 N.E. 37 (1919). 
1954] EFFECT OF CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 17 
Another simple mode of relief which avoids the difficulty involved 
in allowing an action before the promisee is entitled to the property 
is that of setting aside the inter vivos transfer after the promisee's 
rights have matured. Whether it is a contract to will specific prop-
erty65 or an unascertained and indefinite amount depending upon the 
size of the estate66 a transfer made in violation of the contract may 
be set aside after the death of the promisor. Whether the prayer is 
that the deed be set aside and the property permitted to pass under 
a valid unrevoked will, 67 the deed decreed ineffective and a distribu-
tion made according to the terms of the contract as if no transfer had 
been made,68 or merely that the title be quieted in the promisee,69 
or whether the transferees are asked to convey to the promisee,70 seems 
to be immaterial. The right of the promisee to receive the property 
after the death of the promisor cannot be affected by the promisor' s 
wrongful inter vivos transfer, and whatever decree is appropriate to 
that end, provided the rights of innocent third parties have not inter-
vened, will be granted. Where some consideration has been given 
by the transferee, but he is still not in the position of a bona fide 
purchaser, at least one court has set aside the transfer as to part of 
the property while permitting a retention of part as compensation for 
the consideration paid.71 
65 Kastell v. Hillman, 53 N.J. Eq. 49, 30 A. 535 (1894); Envin v. Envin, 17 N.Y.S. 
442 (1892), affd. 139 N.Y. 616, 35 N.E. 204 (1893). 
66Whiton v. Whiton, 179 ill. 32, 53 N.E. 722 (1899); Johnson v. Soden, 152 Kan. 
284, 103 P. (2d) 812 (1940); Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108, 176 S.W. 942 (1915); 
McGuire v. McGuire, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 142 (1874); Riddell v. Riddell, 146 La. 37, 83 
S. 369 (1919); Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S.W. 347 (1906); Getchell v. Tinker, 
291 Mich. 267, 289 N.W. 156 (1939); Lay v. Proctor, 147 Ore. 545, 34 P. (2d) 331 
(1934); Schramm v. Burkhart, 137 Ore. 208, 2 P. (2d) 14 (1931); Daniels v. Aharonian, 
63 R.I. 282, 7 A. (2d) 767 (1939); Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900); 
Quinn v. Quinn, 5 S.D. 328, 58 N.W. 808 (1894); Swingley v. Daniels, 123 Wash. 409, 
212 P. 729 (1923); Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1929); Gregor v. 
Kemp, 3 Swanst. 404, note, 36 Eng. Rep. 926 (1722). 
67Riddell v. Riddell, 146 La. 37, 83 S. 369 (1919); Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 
S.E. 415 (1900); Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1929); Lay v. Proctor, 147 
Ore. 545, 34 P. (2d) 331 (1934) (transferee declared a trustee for the estate and directed 
to convey to the executor so the property could be handled as part of the estate). See 
McGuire v. McGuire, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 142 at 154 (1874). 
68 Daniels v. Aharonian, 63 R.I. 282, 7 A. (2d) 767 (1939); Quinn v. Quinn, 5 
S.D. 328, 58 N.W. 808 (1894); Gregor v. Kemp, 3 Swanst. 404, note, 36 Eng. Rep. 926 
(1722). 
oo McCullom v. Mackrell, 13 S.D. 262, 83 N.W. 255 (1900). 
70Whitney v. Hay, 181 U.S. 77, 21 S.Ct. 537 (1901) (transferee declared a trustee 
and directed to convey to the prornisee); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 S.E. 749 
(1918). 
7l Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900). This was a case in which there 
had been a contract to will one's entire estate in consideration of nursing, care, and main-
tenance for life. The prornisor, without cause, left the care, nursing, and maintenance 
being properly provided by the promisee and transferred his property to the transferee in 
consideration of an agreement for support and maintenance for life. Thus the considera-
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The remedies mentioned above might be very satisfactory in cer-
tain limited situations but are insufficient to cover all the eventualities 
that might arise. The rule that if the promisor has put his property 
beyond the scope of the operation of his will the promisee is relieved 
of performance is of little comfort to a promisee who has already per-
formed, nor will a rule that wrongful inter vivos conveyances may be 
set aside after the death of the promisor be of any assistance in cases 
where the property has gotten into the hands of bona fide purchasers. 
When the promisee attempts to bring his action within the lifetime 
of the promisor he is faced with the difficulty that he has no imme-
diate. claim to the property.72 His contract is that he shall have the 
property at the promisor's death. In the case of a contract for all or 
a fractional part of an estate he is faced with the further difficulty that 
he cannot point to any particular property or any particular value and 
say that that is what he will eventually be entitled to. Regardless of 
the present size of the estate there is always the possibility that it will 
completely evaporate in the normal course of business through bona 
fide inter vivos transactions so that there will never be anything for 
his contract to operate upon. But the fact that the estate may evap-
orate does not require the promisee to endure an improper act tending 
in that direction merely because there is a possibility that his interest 
may never ripen into a possessory estate. 
In the case of specific property an inter vivos conveyance to one 
other than a bona fide purchaser may be set aside even though the 
promisor is still living.73 The same is true with regard to contracts 
tion rendered by the transferee was consideration which, had there been no breach of the 
original agreement, would have been rendered by the promisee. Therefore, it seemed 
equitable that the transferee should be compensated. 
A similar equitable adjustment will be made where the promisee brings action during 
the life of the promisor and it is found that the third person to whom a wrongful convey-
ance has been made has rendered part of the consideration which was to have been rendered 
by the promisee. Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870). 
The soundness of the proposition might well be attacked on the theory · that where 
there is a contract to will property in exchange for services to be rendered to the promisor, 
if the promisor, without cause, ceases to receive the services the promisee may earn his 
legacy or devise by holding himself at all times in readiness to perform. See Davison v. 
Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. (2 Beasley) 246 (1861). 
72 Maud v. Maud, 33 Ohio St. 147 (1877). Dicta can be found to the effect that i£ 
the promisor puts it out of his power to perform the contract, e.g., conveys to a third 
person, the promisee is entitled to specific performance even during the lifetime of the 
promisor, but it is apparent that all that is meant by such statements is that equity will 
interfere during the lifetime of the promisor to protect the promisee's interest which is to 
arise in the future.· Hayes v. Moffatt, 83 Mont. 214 at 229-230, 271 P. 433 (1928). 
73 White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927); Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 
116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (1917) (decree was that the grantee reconvey to the promisor 
and that the promisor hold the legal title impressed with a trust in favor of the promisee); 
Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888); PHugar v. Pultz, 43 N.J. 
Eq. 440, 11 A. 123 (1887); Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. (2 Beasley) 246 (1861). 
1954] EFFECT OF CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 19 
to devise or bequeath all or a fractional part of an estate where the 
transfer is of such a nature as to constitute a violation of the contract,74 
the courts usually failing even to discuss the question of whether or 
not there should be a distinction between specific property and un-
ascertained property.75 Other cases have reached the same result in 
a different manner in that instead of setting the transfer aside they 
have granted a decree that the transferee holds the property subject 
to the contract.76 Where one of two joint promisors dies leaving his 
entire estate to the other for life, remainder to third persons, the prom-
isee is entitled to a decree that, subject to a life interest in the joint 
promisor, the property is impressed with a trust77 for the preservation 
of his right to receive it at the termination of that interest, the sur-
viving promisor being given full power to consume and to dispose for 
reasonable purposes during his lifetime.78 A decree that the grantee 
holds subject to the contract has the advantage of recognizing the 
complete freedom of the promisor to deal with his own interest as he 
sees fit, but at the same time preserving the right of the promisee to 
receive the property at the promisor' s death. Such a theory appears 
particularly desirable when it is remembered that it was this right to 
74 Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. (2d) 568 (1945); Stewart v. 
Shelton, 356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W. (2d) 395 (1947); Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 160 
N.Y.S. 624 (1916) (fraud and undue inHuence exerted by the transferee). 
75 Some courts have indicated that such a distinction should be made. In Galloway 
v. Eichells, l N.J. Super. 584, 62 A. (2d) 499 (1948), a contract was made to will all 
of one's property. After a will had been made pursuant to the contract the promisor revoked 
the will and was about to sell certain lands owned within the state and to leave the state. 
The promisee brought an action for "specific performance" and for an injunction against 
the sale or encumbrance of the land. Just what type of "specific performance" was being 
sought is not clear but it was apparently an attempt to compel the execution of the will. 
The court denied any equitable relief at all and stated that the plaintiff's only remedy was 
an action at law in quantum meruit for the consideration that had been given. Although 
the court seemed to rely heavily upon the fact that no particular property was bound and 
to indicate that if particular property were bound they could have granted equitable relief 
of some sort, the case cannot be taken as authority for the proposition that equitable relief 
could never be granted within the lifetime of the promisor in case of contracts to will all 
of one's estate. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that there was an allegation 
that the sale being threatened was other than a reasonable one or that there was danger 
that the property was about to be wrongfully put outside the scope of the promisor's estate. 
Of course the mere fact that there was about to be a sale should not entitle the promisor 
to immediate relief unless specific property was involved. 
76 Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Cal. 336, 184 P. 854 (1919) (action brought during the 
lifetime of the promisor, but promisor died before judgment was rendered); Clancy v. 
Flusky, 187 ill. 605, 58 N.E. 594 (1900) (promisor died during the pendency of the 
suit, and the decree rendered merely quieted title in the promisee); Newman v. French, 
138 Iowa 482, 116 N.W. 468 (1908); Hill v. Ribble, 132 N.J. Eq. 486, 28 A. (2d) 780 
(1942) (enjoined further conveyance); Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (I Beasley) 
142 (1858). 
77 The court referred to this as a trust though the utility of the use of the term trust 
in this connection may well be questioned. 
78 Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 24 N.W. (2d) 704 (1946). 
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receive the property at the death of the promisor that was the subject 
of the contract in the first place. 
The theory of the relief granted in these cases is that it is neces-
sary to prevent future harm. Although the promisee is not entitled 
to the fruits of his contract at the time the action is brought, if relief 
is postponed there is danger that he will be forever foreclosed by the 
intervention of bona fide purchasers or by the permanent destruction 
of the property. He has not been harmed when the action is brought 
but alleges that he will be irreparably harmed in the future if the 
court does not intervene in his behalf. His relief has been described 
in some of the cases as being in the nature of a bill quia timet.79 But 
whatever might be the theoretical explanation, the relief given should 
always be sufficiently flexible to take care of the exigencies of the 
particular cases. 
Merely setting aside transfers wrongfully made is often inadequate 
relief if the recalcitrant promisor is left free to follow it with other 
transfers equally prejudical to the rights of the promisee. This danger 
may be averted by including in the decree setting a conveyance aside80 
or directing that the grantee hold subject to the rights of the prom-
isee81 an injunction against future conveyances. Even though there 
has been no wrongful conveyance by the promisor, the promisee is 
entitled to an injunction against a threatened transfer which is likely 
to result in putting the property beyond his reach.82 One of the prob-
lems not often discussed by the courts is the difficulty in framing a 
79 '.'Though she is not, at this stage of the case, entitled to specilic performance, either 
positively or negatively, she is entitled to maintain a suit on the principle of quia timet, 
to preserve her rights in the contract and property, and to protect her in performance, to 
the end that she may ultimately be in a position to claim and secure the benefits of the 
contract." White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304 at 1308, 211 N.W. 839 (1927) (setting aside 
a deed and enjoining the grantee's interference with the promisee's performance of the 
contract). 
For a case decreeing that the grantee holds the property subject to the rights of the 
promisee, and giving particular attention to an analysis of the theory of the relief in terms 
of quia timet see Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (1 Beasley) 142 (1858). 
The protection of property against danger of present loss or deterioration on behalf of 
one having a future right of enjoyment has long been recognized as a proper application 
of the quia timet doctrine. 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§825-851 (1836). 
so PHugar v. Pultz, 43 N.J. Eq. 440, 11 A. 123 (1887); Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. 
Eq. (2 Beasley) 246 (1861). 
81 Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482, 116 N.W. 468 (1908); Hill v. Ribble, 132 
N.J. Eq. 486, 28 A. (2d) 780 (1942). 
82 Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 28 S.E. (2d) 255 (1943) (restrained from selling 
the land, cutting timber, or otherwise damaging the property); Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 
172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915); Schondelmayer v. Schondelmayer, 320 Mich. 565, 
31 N.W. (2d) 721 (1948); Winchell v. Mooer, 316 Mich. 151, 25 N.W. (2d) 147 
(1946) (injunction against disposing for any purpose except support and maintenance 
unless property of equal value is received in refum); Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 
514 (1889) (restrained from conveying or encumbering); Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 
Minn. 369, 24 N.W. (2d) 704 (1946) (permitted to dispose for reasonable purposes). 
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decree of this nature which will protect the rights of the promisee 
a:o.d at the same time preserve to the promisor his privilege of making 
such good faith transfers as suit his needs or convenience. In their 
enthusiasm to protect promisees the courts have sometimes failed to 
exercise the proper degree of caution to see that they do not give them 
more protection than they deserve. In Campbell 17. Dunkelberget33 
a contract covering an entire estate was involved, the will having al-
ready been made subject to a contract not to change. The beneficiary 
of the contract sought an injunction against a threatened wrongful 
conveyance of a certain piece of realty included in the estate. The 
decree granted restrained the promisor from "disposing of the prop-
erty ... in any manner." To impose such a restriction is probably 
to hold the promisor to more than he bargained for and to restrict him 
in a manner not contemplated by the parties to the contract. It is 
probably more desirable that decrees of this kind be restricted to en-
joining particular threatened transfers or, at least, to transfers of a 
particular nature. A threatened transfer should not be enjoined un-
less it is one made in bad faith or one which is otherwise sufficiently 
unreasonable to constitute an actual violation of the contract, a mere 
allegation that the promisor is about to sell the property not being 
sufficient to state a cause of action.84 
This tendency of the courts to extend all protection possible to the 
promisee coupled with the desire of equity to give complete relief in 
one action has led to some peculiar results. In Chantland 17. Sher-
man85 there was a contract to divide an estate equally between the 
promisor's daughter and stepdaughter. When the promisor repudiated 
her contract by an open declaration of intention not to leave any-
thing to the stepdaughter, a decree was obtained directing the im-
mediate conveyance to the stepdaughter of an undivided one-half of 
the promisor's estate subject to a life interest in the promisor.86 Just 
what would have been the effect of the conveyance should the entire 
estate have become necessary to the support and maintenance of the 
promisor was not dealt with in the opinion. While this type of re-
lief might have been appropriate if specific property had been involved, 
it is difficult to justify in the situation presented. 
83172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915). 
84 Schauer v. Schauer, 43 N.M. 209, 89 P. (2d) 521 (1939). Cf. Galloway v. 
Eichells, 1 N.J. Super. 584, 62 A. (2d) 499 (1948). 
85 148 Iowa 352, 125 N.W. 871 (1910). 
86 See Winchell v. Mixter, 316 Mich. 151, 25 N.W. (2d) 147 (1946), where a 
similar relief was given, but the decree framed in such a manner as to limit its application 
to an amount not to exceed the economic value which would have shifted to the promisees 
at the death of the promisor if they had never entered into the contract at all. 
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Where a promisor subject to a contract to will his entire estate 
to particular persons at his death begins making extravagant gifts, thus 
indicating a danger of dissipation of the estate, a trustee has been 
appointed to take immediate control of the property and manage it 
for the benefit of the promisor during his life and at the same time 
preserve the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries or promisees. 87 This 
type of relief, like the immediate conveyance to the promisee, reaches a 
result not provided for in the contract. Both have the effect of pre-
serving the promisee' s interest by giving a high degree of insurance 
. against the possibility of the property falling into the hands of bona 
fide purchasers,88 but they both have the disadvantage of imposing 
upon the parties a relationship definitely not included in the contract. 
Such relief should not be resorted to unless, under the facts of the 
particular case, it appears to be the only means of protecting the prom-
isee' s interest.89 Otherwise the courts are likely to find themselves 
enforcing contracts which have little relation to the contracts actually 
entered into by the parties.90 
87 Lawrence v. Ashba, ll5 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. (2d) 568 (1945). 
88 In the case of real property the promisee is given the very material advantage of a 
record title to protect his interest. No case has been found where it has been necessary 
to rule upon the question whether or not he could secure this advantage by recording the 
contract itself. In Ankeny v. Lieuallen, 169 Ore. 206, ll3 P. (2d) lll3 (1941), affd. on 
rehearing 169 Ore. 222, 127 P. (2d) 735 (1942), the contract was on record, but the 
mortgagee taking a subsequent mortgage on the property had actual notice of the contract, 
and the court refused to rule on whether or not the record notice would have been sufficient. 
In Getchell v. Tinker, 291 Mich. 267, 289 N.W. 156 (1939), a contract to dispose 
of property at death was incorporated in a property settlement agreement between an 
estranged husband and wife which was recorded in the office of the register of deeds. But 
in setting aside an inter vivos conveyance made in violation of the contract the court gave 
no indication whether reliance was made upon record notice to the grantee or whether for 
some other reason the grantee was not a bona fide purchaser. 
Likewise in Krcmar v. Krcmar, 202 Iowa II66, 2ll N.W. 699 (1927), a written 
contract between a father and son reciting the fact that it was agreed that a codicil executed 
by the father devising certain property to the son was to act as a conveyance was acknowl-
edged by both parties and recorded. Thereafter the father conveyed the property to his 
wife and died. In an action to quiet title it was held that the property went to the son by 
virtue of the recorded contract. Although the court noted that the grantee had "construc-
tive notice of the contract by reason of its being of record" (202 Iowa at II70), the case is 
not conclusive authority for that proposition since it was also shown that the grantee had 
actual notice, and it was not indicated in the opinion that she gave consideration for the 
conveyance. 
The contract was acknowledged and recorded in Ochs v. Ochs, 122 N.J. Eq. 143, 192 
A. 502 (1937), but no question concerning the effect of the record was raised in the 
litigation that developed. 
so As between the two the decree putting title in the promisee subject to the life 
estate in the promisor should be least likely to frustrate the intent of the parties. Here 
the effect would usually be the same as would have resulted if the contract had been 
carried out." However, the establishment of the trust might be particularly undesirable 
because of the cost of administering the trust. It would certainly be unwise in the small 
estates usually involved in this type of transaction. 
90 See Huffine v. Lincoln, 52 Mont. 585, 160 P. 820 (1916). 
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One of the difficulties experienced in enjoining conveyances prej-
udicial to the interests of th~ promisee arises out of the fact that the 
consideration given by the promisee is often personal services to be 
performed for the promisor as long as he lives. The wrongful transfer 
of the property is usually accompanied by an abandonment of the 
receipt of the services. It seems that the proper conclusion is that so 
long as the promisee holds himself in readiness to render the services 
he is entitled to the protection of his interests.91 In some situations 
where extreme unpleasantness has developed between the parties so 
as to make the personal services contracted for virtually impossible the 
court might require an alternative type of performance by the prom-
isee as a condition precedent to the granting of equitable relief. In 
White v. Massee92 an aged father contracted with his daughter that 
he would devise the daughter a certain tract of land if the daughter 
and her husband would abandon their existing home and move into 
the home of the father, and nurse and care for him as long as he 
lived. After the daughter entered upon performance the father left 
the home and purported to transfer the land to his son. The daughter 
brought her bill in equity to enjoin the son from interfering with her 
performance of the contract and to cancel the deed. Although the 
daughter was still holding herself in readiness to perform her obliga-
tion and had not committed any act that could be termed a breach of 
her duty toward her father, such a degree of unpleasantness had de-
veloped between them that it was unthinkable that the father could 
return to the home occupied by the daughter. While granting the 
relief asked for the court exercised its extraordinary powers and re-
91 Pflugar v. Pultz, 43 N.J. Eq. 440, 11 A. 123 (1887); Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J. 
Eq. (2 Beasley) 246 (1861). In Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 9 A. (2d) 639 
(1939), it might appear that an opposite result was reached but the decision was actually 
based on other grounds. In that case the promisor agreed to pay weekly wages for services 
rendered as well as devise certain real estate by will. The contract was oral and therefore 
within the statute of frauds. After being discharged from her employment the promisee 
brought action to enforce specific performance within the lifetime of the promisor. It was 
found that since the services already rendered were neither unequivocably referable to 
the contract or incapable of monetary valuation there was no basis for relief against the 
operation of the statute of frauds; consequently, the contract could not be enforced. There 
is nothing in the case to indicate that if the statute of frauds barrier could have been over-
come the promisee would not have been entitled to protection of her interest in the real 
estate. 
Where the promisee was also lessee of the premises and the promisor lessor had 
conveyed to a third person who joined with the promisor in an effort to terminate the lease 
it was decreed that the grantee held subject to the contract, that further conveyance be 
enjoined, and that the promisee was entitled to the property upon the death of the 
promisor provided he continued to fulfill his obligations under the contract. Hill v. Ribble, 
132 N.J. Eq. 486, 28 A. (2d) 780 (1942). 
92 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927). 
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quired as a condition precedent to the issuance of the decree the pay-
ment by the daughter of a reasonable rent into court to be applied to 
the support and maintenance of the father. 
The personal service feature of these contracts has also caused an 
encounter with the mutuality of remedy doctrine where injunctive 
relief has been sought. Where the obligation of the promisee con-
sists of the performance of personal services which could not be spe-
cifically enforced, at least one court has refused to enjoin the prom-
isor from giving away or disposing of her property in a manner in-
consistent with the terms of the contract.93 The reason given for the 
decision was that equity will not enjoin a breach of a contract which 
is incapable of specific enforcement, and that this one could not be 
specifically enforced because of lack of mutuality of remedy. It seems 
that this difficulty could have been avoided by the application of the 
theory that the relief sought was not an in junction against a breach 
of contract but an injunction to protect an interest in property whose 
conveyance to the promisee was to become due at a future time. 
As previously indicated the usual ground for equitable jurisdiction 
in these cases is that it is necessary to protect a legally cognizable 
interest which is not being presently infringed upon, but which is in 
danger of permanent loss if present steps are not taken to ward off 
such danger. There is nothing inherent in a contract to make a will 
which automatically gives equity jurisdiction of the case. The usual 
reasons for equitable relief must of course be found. Paramount among 
these are inadequacy of remedy at law and, at least in this situation, 
danger of irreparable damage to or loss of property. 
In case of a contract to devise specific real estate the nature of the 
property itself should be sufficient to give equitable jurisdiction in 
the same way that equity will interfere when the vendor of a con-
tract to sell land is about to commit an act which will make perform-
ance impossible. But equitable relief is not limited to promises to de-
vise specific real estate. As has already been observed, courts grant 
the various types of equitable relief in cases where the property to be 
devised or bequeathed depends upon the size of the promisor' s estate 
us O'Brien v. O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 241 P. 861 (1925). In Nunn v. Boal, 29 Ohio 
App. 141, 162 N.E. 724 (1928), "specific performance" of a contract to devise specific 
real estate in return for personal services was denied, the court giving lack of mutuality as 
a reason for the decision. The action was brought within the lifetime of the promisor and 
before the promisee had fully performed and before he was, according to any construction, 
entitled to the property. See Maud v. Maud, 33 Ohio St. 147 (1877). Just what theory 
specific performance could have been granted on at that time is difficult to see. H the 
action had been one to protect the right to receive the real estate at the later date a 
better case for the plaintiff might have been presented. 
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at death, 94 and often fail to give any discussion whatever as to the 
possibility of any distinction between this type of case and a case 
where speeific property is involved. This failure to discuss the type 
of the property promised as a basis for equitable jurisdiction is prob-
ably due to the fact that other grounds are usually present. 
Often the consideration for contracts to devise or bequeath con-
sists of the rendering of companionship, society, or filial devotion to 
the promisor. In such cases the emphasis placed upon the difficulty 
or impossibility of determining the pecuniary value of the services 
rendered might tend to create the impression that the courts are re-
lying upon this factor as a basis for equitable jurisdiction.95 How-
ever, it is believed that any proper analysis of the cases will reveal that 
the emphasis appears only when the agreement is oral and the unique-
ness of the promisee' s services is significant because it is an element 
to be considered in determining whether or not there has been suffi-
cient part performance to remove the contract from the operation of 
the statute of frauds.96 The peculiar nature of the services might well 
be an important factor where a statute of frauds problem is raised but 
it cannot be said to form a basis for equitable jurisdiction. 
Where a husband and wife have contracted with each other that 
the property of the survivor shall go to a particular beneficiary a court 
of equity will interfere after the death of the first to die and before 
the death of the survivor to protect the interest of the beneficiary.97 
Such contracts usually include either inter vivos or testamentary trans-
fers of property between the spouses as part of the consideration. The 
courts then often offer as a reason for equitable jurisdiction the theory 
that since the promisor received part of his estate through and as a 
result of the contract, he will not be permitted to deal with the prop-
erty in a manner inconsistent with his bargain.98 Standing alone this 
94 Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. (2d) 568 (1945) (trustee 
appointed during the lifetime of the promisor); Winchell v. Mixter, 316 Mich. 151, 25 
N.W. (2d) 147 (1946) (decree that promisee was owner subject to the life interest in 
the promisor); Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 24 N.W. (2d) 704 (1946) (decree 
that the property is impressed with a trust for the preservation of the promisee's interest); 
Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (I Beasley) 142 (1858) (decree that the property is 
held subject to the interest of the promisee); Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 160 N.Y.S. 
624 (1916) (inter vivos transfer by the promisor set aside). 
95 See Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 24 N.W. (2d) 704 (1946); Van• 
duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (I Beasley) 142 (1858). 
06 2 CoRBIN, CoNTRAC'I's §435 (1950); PoMBROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3d ed., 
§114 (1926). 
97 Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915); Lawrence v. 
Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. (2d) 568 (1945); Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 
160 N.Y.S. 624 (1916). 
98 In Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915), the court 
merely said that the wife was estopped from making any distribution of the property except 
that provided in the contract. It is difficult to see how there is a basis for estoppel here. 
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would appear to be an empty assertion inasmuch as the ~xtent to 
which the property received from the other spouse increased the size 
of the promisor' s estate could be readily determined and compensated 
for in damages. 
Where a holder of a future interest in property transfers his in-
terest to the holder of the estate of present enjoyment upon a con-
tract that the transferee will devise or bequeath a proportionate part 
of his estate to the transferor at his death, the interest thus acquired 
by the transferor will be protected by equity.99 The same result is also 
reached even where it is perfectly obvious that there is nothing pe-
culiar in the nature of the consideration and absolutely no means by 
which the consideration given can be associated with the thing prom-
, ised.100 The effect of these cases is a clear demonstration that the 
grounds for equitable relief are to be found in the right of the prom-
isee and not in the nature of the consideration promised or furnished 
by him. The promisee has acquired a right which is worthy of pro-
tection and for which there is no adequate remedy at law. That right 
is that the entire property of the promisor shall be permitted to How 
to him upon the death of the promisor with only such diminution 
or impairment as is consistent with reasonable use by the promisor. 
It is a right to receive property at some future time and relief in equity 
· should be based solely upon the protection of that right. The value 
of the right is impossible of determination within the lifetime of the 
promisor. The promisor has the privilege of consuming or disposing 
of the entire estate during his lifetime, the only restriction being that 
he do so in a reasonable manner. The promisee has no present in-
terest in any property of any kind and there is no assurance that he 
will ever have any such interest. His interest is future and contingent. 
Any attempted inter vivos gift which is unreasonable or any act of 
waste or any other act of the promisor which violates the contract is 
a wrong against the promisee, but when he brings action in equity he 
is not seeking redress for that wrong. He is seeking the court's pro-
tection against the future effect of the wrong.101 If action is delayed 
until the promisee is actually entitled to the property contracted for 
there is danger that the entire estate will be dissipated through im-
99 Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352, 125 N.W. 871 (1910); Winchell v. Mbcter, 
316 Mich. 151, 25 N.W. (2d) 147 (1946). 
100 Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N.E. 528, rehearing den. 87 Ind. App. 52, 
157 N.E. 104 (1927) (consideration consisted of professional service the value of which 
could have been easily determined and which it was admitted was extremely small in 
comparison to the property promised). 
101 Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (1 Beasley) 142 (1858). 
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proper channels and will be beyond his reach. The aid of equity is 
invoked for the preservation of property to its proper function.102 
Although the promisee has the privilege of pursuing equitable 
relief when the promisor repudiates the contract, he is not limited to 
that type of procedure. The promisee may, at his election,103 treat 
the contract as rescinded and maintain an action on the theory of 
quantum meruit:1°4 or maintain an action on the contract on the theory 
of the anticipatory breach.105 The principal difference between the 
theory of equitable and legal relief in this type of case is that where 
equitable relief is sought the plaintiff is usually seeking the aid of 
the court to protect an interest in particular assets whose conveyance 
to him is due at a future time. In the action at law he is seeking im-
mediate redress for the wrong of the defendant. The failure of liti-
gants to state clearly the theory of their actions has resulted in a con-
fusion among the courts concerning the nature of the relief granted, 
and this confusion has developed many apparent inconsistencies in 
the opinions. This confusion and these inconsistencies will tend to 
disappear if the relief sought in each particular case is carefully an-
alyzed. 
It is essential to remember in all cases that the promisor has his 
entire life within which to perform a contract to make a will. Whether 
the action is at law or in equity there is no basis for expecting an ac-
tual performance of the contract prior to the promisor' s death. To con-
stitute a basis for a cause of action the repudiation by the promisor 
must be positive and absolute. Mere statements by the promisor made 
in the heat of anger and unaccompanied by any acts will not con-
stitute a breach cognizable either at law or in equity,1°6 nor is an offer 
102 This is analogous to many situations where equitable relief is sought to protect 
against a future loss from an improper assertion of rights, as under a written instrument 
such as a deed which could become a cloud on the plaintiff's title or a negotiable instrument 
which could become a claim against the plaintiff if transferred to a bona fide purchaser. 
With regard to equitable relief of this nature generally see McCLINTocK, EQUITY §184 
(1936); 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 12th ed., §§825-851 (1877); 6 WILLISTON, 
CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1880 (1938). 
103 See Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 77, 96 N.E. 780, 782 (1911) (contract 
for specific real estate); Moorhead v. Fry, 24 Pa. (12 Harris) 37 at 38-39 (1854) (con-
tract for all property owned at death). In each of these cases the action was in quantum 
meruit. While granting the relief asked for the court indicated in each case that a choice 
of remedies was available. 
104 Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 96 N.E. 780 (1911); Canada v. Canada, 60 
Mass. (6 Cushing) 15 (1850); Smith v. Long, 183 Okla. 441, 83 P. (2d) 167 (1938); 
Moorhead v. Fry, 24 Pa. (12 Harris) 37 (1854). 
105 Edwards v. Slate, 184 Mass. 317, 68 N.E. 342 (1903). See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 
197 Cal. 577, 241 P. 861 (1925); Farrington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 S. (2d) 
158 (1944) (action brought within the life of the promisor but promisor died while the 
suit was pending); McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N.C. 463, 87 S.E. 244 (1915). 
106 Henson v. Neumann, 286 ill. App. 197, 3 N.E. (2d) 110 (1936). 
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by the promisor to satisfy his obligation by an inter vivos payment of 
a sum considered inadequate by the promisee sufficient basis for a 
cause of action within the promisor's lifetime.107 A statement of re-
pudiation accompanied by a refusal by the promisor to receive further 
performance by the promisee108 or a disposition of the property in-
consistent with the terms of the contract:1°9 is sufficient to constitute 
a breach. The same has been held where the promisor executed an 
inconsistent will and openly declared his intent not to perform the 
contract.110 The development of extreme animosity between promisor 
and promisee might be sufficient indication of a probable effort by 
the promisor to avoid his obligation to justify an injunction against a 
wrongful inter vivos transfer.111 
The theory of the action in quantum meruit is that the promisee 
is willing to treat this repudiation by the promisor as putting an end 
to the contract and that the promisee is merely asking for a return of 
the consideration paid.112 There is no effort in this action to insist 
upon any rights acquired under the contract and no effort to obtain 
either the property or the value of the property contracted for. It is 
simply an action for payment of the actual value of the services ren-
dered or other consideration paid in reliance upon the contract. Since 
such a rescission of the contract puts an end to any interest the prom-
isee might have acquired in the property promised, it would seem to 
follow that the promisee, in an action in quantum meruit, is not en-
titled to any lien upon the property of the promisor for payment of 
his damages, and such has been the conclusion of the courts.113 
107 Patterson v. Patterson, 13 Johns. (N.Y.) 379 (1816). 
10s Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 96 N.E. 780 (19ll); Carter v. Witherspoon, 
156 Miss. 597, 126 S. 388 (1930). 
109 Canada v. Canada, 60 Mass. (6 Cushing) 15 (1850); Moorhead v. Fry, 24 Pa. 
(12 Harris) 37 (1854). It might be argued that since the promisor has his entire life-
time within which to perform his contract, there could not be a breach in any event until 
his death. There is always the possibility that even though he disposes of the property he 
may later reacquire it and devise or bequeath it in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract. Such an argument, however, would be highly fanciful and has not appealed to the 
courts, 
110 Smith v. Long, 183 Okla. 441, 83 P. (2d) 167 (1938) • 
• 111 Schondelmayer v. Schondelmayer, 320 Mich. 565, 31 N.W. (2d) 721 (1948). 
112 Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 96 N.E. 780 (1911); Johnston v. Myers, 138 
Iowa 497, 116 N.W. 600 (1908); Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E. (2d) 137 
(1947); Canada v. Canada, 60 Mass. (6 Cushing) 15 (1850); Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 
Miss. 597, 126 S. 388 (1930); Moorhead v. Fry, 24 Pa. (12 Harris) 37 (1854). 
113 Johnston v. Myers, 138 Iowa 497, 116 N.W. 600 (1908); Carter v. Witherspoon, 
156 Miss. 597, 126 S. 388 (1930). The language of the court in each of these cases 
tended to indicate that no equitable relief could be obtained during the lifetime of the 
promisor, but such a position is far beyond what was necessary to the decision of the case. 
In each case the contract was for the whole propertY of the promisor. The promisee was 
trying to obtain a return of his consideration during the life of the promisor. To have given 
him a lien on any specific propertY of the promisor would have given him a lien upon 
property which might never have come to him if the contract had been fully performed. 
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In an action for damages for anticipatory breach the promisee is 
abandoning his prospects of receiving the thing contracted for the same 
as he is in the action in quantum meruit. The distinction between 
the two is that in the action for the anticipatory breach, the promisee 
is still treating the contract as in force and is praying for a measure-
ment of damages based on the actual loss caused by the bre?ch, not 
merely for a return of the consideration paid.114 This type of relief 
is impracticable in cases where the amount of property devised or 
bequeathed is to be determined by the size of the promisor' s estate 
at death for the reason that when the action is brought there is little 
basis for estimating the size of that estate. However, if the contract 
is for a specific object or a liquidated sum of money there should be 
little difficulty in estimating the amount of damages. Of course the 
value of the property promised will not be the amount of damages 
because according to the terms of the contract it is a future, not a 
presently due, performance to which the promisee is entitled, and life 
expectancies must be taken into account in calculating damages.115 
In the usual situation the breach will also be accompanied by a forced 
termination of performance by the promisee before he has completed 
his part of the consideration. In such cases it is the promisee' s right 
to earn the legacy that is destroyed by the breach and it is the value 
of this right that constitutes the measure of damages.1111 If the prom-
isee has been let into possession and has made improvements upon 
the land promised to be devised, the cost of the improvements reason-
ably incurred is a proper item of damages even though the cost might 
exceed the value added to the land.117 
Due to variations in the facts of individual cases and in the manner 
in which they are brought before the courts, a count of jurisdictions 
recognizing or refusing to recognize any particular type of relief is 
impossible. However, it appears that equitable relief will be granted, 
whether specific real estate118 or an indefinite amount of property based 
on the size of the promisor's estate at death110 is involved, provided 
114 See Farrington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 S. (2d) 158 (1944). 
m Synge v. Synge, [1894] 1 Q.B. 466. 
116Edwards v. Slate, 184 Mass. 317, 68 N.E. 342 (1903) (contract for a specific sum 
0£ money). But see Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E. (2d) 137 (1947). 
117 Trisch v. Fairman, 334 Mich. 432, 54 N.W. (2d) 621 (1952) (action was in 
equity for a money decree). 
11s Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 28 S.E. (2d) 255 (1943); White v. Massee, 202 
Iowa 1304, 211 N.W. 839 (1927); Brackenbmy v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 
(1917); Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889). 
110 Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. (2d) 568 (1945); Campbell v. 
Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915); Winchell v. Mixter, 316 Mich. 151, 
25 N.W. (2d) 147 (1946); Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 24 N.W. (2d) 704 
(1946). 
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the action is brought on the theory of seeking protection of an equit-
able right to receive property at a future time.120 Equitable relief will 
not be granted where the relief sought is immediate redress for the 
wrong committed by the promisor,121 nor would it seem to be appro-
priate where a liquidated sum of money or a specific non-unique 
chattel is involved. Actions at law for damages caused by breach 
should be available in any event where such damages are capable of 
measurement,122 and the action at law for recovery in quantum meruit 
·should be available where the value of the consideration paid can be 
reasonably ascertained.123 Where the situation presented is suscep-
tible of more than one type of remedy, as is usually the case, the 
choice should rest with the plaintiff.124 Statements apparently in 
conllict with the forms of relief here indicated are sometimes found 
but are usually without foundation. Where the contract is within 
the statute of frauds and recovery is denied on the ground. that the 
part performance alleged is neither unequivocally referable to the con-
tract or incapable of monetary valuation the language used in some 
opinions tends .to indicate that in any event where the promisee of 
a contract to devise or bequeath can be adequately compensated for 
the consideration furnished no equitable relief will be granted within 
the lifetime of the promisor.126 If such a proposition were actually 
applied it would seem to ignore the principle that a party to a con-
120 Recovery often fails where some other theory is used. In Stone v. Burgeson, 215 
Ala. 23, 109 S. 155 (1926), the prayer was "for a decree ascertaining the amount of 
' respondent's indebtedness to complainant, as alleged, and declaring it to be a lien on 
respondent's land, or, in the alternative, for a decree requiring respondent to carry out his 
agreement by executing a will as promised." Id. at 24. Relief was denied, the court indi-
cating by way of dictum that the only remedy was at law. Since the contract was one for 
all the promisor's estate at death it is apparent that the relief sought merely tended to 
obscure the rights of the promisee. If the case had been framed in terms of the right of 
the promisee to have the estate Row to him at death of the promisor, with only reasonable 
diminution during the promisor's life, equitable protection of that right might have been 
obtained. 
121 This question arises where the promisee is seeking immediate redress while the 
promisor is still living and entitled to reasonable use and consumption of any or all of his 
property, but the promisee seeks to establish a lien for the amount recovered upon some 
specific property included in the estate. In refusing the right to such a lien, the ~ouxts 
often indicate by way of dictum the unnecessary and much broader proposition that equi-
table relief can never be granted while the promisor is still alive if the promisee's perform-
ance can be compensated for in damages. Johnston v. Myers, 138 Iowa 497, 116 N.W. 
600 (1908); Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597, 126 S. 388 (1930). 
122 Edwards v. Slate, 184 Mass. 317, 68 N.E. 342 (1903). 
123 Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 96 N.E. 780 (1911); Canada v. Canada, 60 
Mass. (6 Cushing) 15 (1850); Moorhead v. Fry, 24 Pa. (12 Harris) 37 (1854). 
124 See Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 77, 96 N.E. 780, 782 (1911); Moorhead 
v. Fry, 24 Pa. (12 Harris) 37 at 38-39 (1854). 
125 See Richardson v. Richardson, 114 Minn. 12, 130 N.W. 4 (1911) (contract for 
promisor's entire estate); Nunn v. Boal, 29 Ohio App. 141, 162 N.E. 724 (1928) (contract 
for specific real estate). 
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tract is entitled to the benefit of his bargain, in this situation a benefit 
not available to him in any way except through a protection of his 
right to receive the thing promised. On the other hand, there is 
authority that an action at law will not be entertained during the life-
time of the promisor because no performance is due, but that equity 
might be called upon to preserve the property so that it will be avail-
able for the purposes of the contract upon the promisor's death.126 
This position denies the rather general rule of contract law that re-
pudiation by one party gives the other a right to rescind and recover 
the consideration paid.127 Still other courts have apparently felt that 
an action at law for a breach will not lie within the promisor' s lifetime 
but that recovery in quantum meruit should be permitted.128 
Although some conflicts of authority do exist and at least some 
support can probably be found for almost any position one chooses to 
take, it is believed that most of these differences of opinion are more 
apparent than real, and, more often than not, result from the manner 
in which the case is presented rather than any real difference in views 
as to the law on the subject.129 When the theory of the action is based 
squarely upon the principles outlined above relief is rarely denied. 
126 See Warden v. Hinds, ( 4th Cir. 1908) 163 F. 201 at 206 (action at law for 
damages, but while denying relief the court stated that if it could be shown that there 
was danger of loss through extravagance or misconduct the promisee might possibly "file a 
bill quia timet on the equity side of the docket to have such testator declared a trustee to 
the extent of the claim; but •.. an action at law does not lie during the lifetime of the 
proposed testator"); Henson v. Neumann, 286 lli. App. 197 at 203-205, 3 N.E. (2d) ll0 
(1936) (decision actually based upon failure to show a sufficient act of repudiation). 
127 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1466 (1937). 
128 See Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E. (2d) 137 (1947) (oral contract to 
devise real estate but statute of frauds was not pleaded). 
129 Cases denying an equitable lien on specific property where action is brought in the 
promisor's lifetime for return of the consideration paid in contracts to will an entire estate 
have often given the appearance of holding that equitable relief would not be granted if 
the value of the consideration could be reasonably ascertained. Johnston v. Myers, 138 Iowa 
497, ll6 N.W. 600 (1908); Carter v. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597, 126 S. 388 (1930). A 
similar erroneous implication is found where relief was denied in a case where the prayer 
was "for a decree ascertaining the amount of respondent's indebtedness to complainant, as 
alleged, and declaring it to be lien on respondent's land, or, in the alternative, for a decree 
requiring respondent to carry out his agreement by executing a will as promised." It is not 
easy to see any possible basis for relief on a prayer of this sort. Stone v. Burgeson, 215 
Ala. 23 at 24, 109 S. 155 (1926). 
Where an employment contract included payment of wages and also a promise of a 
devise or bequest, and it was found that termination of the employment did not affect the 
promise to devise or bequeath and there was nothing to indicate that the contract would 
be impossible of enforcement at the death of the promisor, recovery was denied. Unfortu-
nately the language of the opinion tended toward the conclusion that action on a contract 
to devise or bequeath could not be brought during the lifetime of the promisor. Warden 
v. Hinds, (4th Cir. 1908) 163 F. 201. 
Where there was nothing to indicate that a threatened disposition of property was not 
a reasonable one equitable relief was denied, but the language of the court seemed broad 
enough to include the erroneous proposition that equitable relief could never be obtained 
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The right of the promisee to receive the property at the death of 
the promisor is a right which will descend to his heirs or personal rep-
resentatives at his death,130 may be devised,131 or may be assigned.182 
during the lifetime of the promiser in a contract to will all of one's property. Galloway 
v. Eichells, 1 N.J. Super. 584, 62 A. (2d) 499 (1948). 
A denial of relief where there was a failure to show a sufficient act of repudiation has 
included dictum to the dfect that no action at law can be brought on a contract unless 
some performance is due. Henson v. Neumann, 286 ID. App. 197, 3 N.E. (2d) 1 IO (1936). 
130 Trower v. Young, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 539, 105 P. (2d) 160 (1940); Powell v. 
McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 269 N.W. 883 (1936); Kisor v. Litzenberg, 203 Iowa 1183, 212 
N.W. 343 (1927); Moore's Admr. v. Wagers' Admr., 243 Ky. 351, 48 S.W. (2d) 15 
(1932); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 Mo. App. 18 (1892); Torgerson v. Hauge, 34 N.D. 646, 159 
N.W. 6 (1916). See Young v. Young, 45 N.J. Eq. 27 at 34-35, 16 A. 921 (1889); Prater 
v. Prater, 94 S.C. 267, 77 S.E. 936 (1912) (specific performance denied because of the 
breach by the successor in interest, but right to recover for performance actually rendered 
recognized even under those circumstances without raising any question as to the descendi-
bility of the right); Estate of Leu, 172 Wis. 530, 179 N.W. 796 (1920) (recovery denied 
because of the statute of limitations and statute of frauds, but the survival of the claim to 
the administrator ·or the successors in interest apparently not questioned); 4 PAGE, WILLS, 
3d ed., §1755 (1941). But cf. Pershall v. Elliott, 249 N.Y. 183, 163 N.E. 554 (1928) 
[reaches a contra result, but it is not clear that this is not based on the terms of this par-
ticular contract, and the case is further distinguished in Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799 
at 804-805, 269 N.W. 883 (1936)). 
An opposite view is found in Hirsch, "Contracts to Devise and Bequeath: II," 9 Wxs. 
L. REv. 388 (1934), where O'Neil v. Ross, 98 Cal. App. 306, 277 P. 123 (1929) and 
Snyder v. Snyder, 77 Wis. 95, 45 N.W. -818 (1890), are cited as authority. A careful 
examination of the cases cited leaves considerable doubt as to the soundness of the conclu-
sion reached. In O'Neil v. Ross a contract is found on very doubtful evidence and then 
the court seems to hold that one under a contractual obligation to will his entire estate is 
really the owner of a .fee with a mandatory special power of appointment and that the 
death of the intended appointees before the death of the appointor makes the exercise of 
the power impossible. The analysis of the problem in terms of powers is unusual to say 
the least. No reference is made to Chase v. Stevens, 34 Cal. App. 98, 166 P. 1035 (1917), 
where the right of the promisee of a contract to make a will to devise his interest was clearly 
upheld. The court in O'Neil v. Ross was apparently misled by the erroneous belief that 
it was dealing with a power of appointment. Snyder v. Snyder is another case in which, 
although the existence of a contract was found by the court, the evidence of it was very 
doubtful. A son was put on a £arm by his father with the understanding that the son 
"would keep and work it in a good and husband-like manner while he occupied it, and 
that he would behave and conduct himself like a good man ••• " (77 Wis. 95 at 99, 45 
N.W. 818), and that the father would if the son met these conditions devise him the land 
at his death. The court ·reached the conclusion that since the son "died more than twelve 
years before the father, the agreement under which the son entered into possession could 
not be carried out as the parties intended it should, and there is nothing that a court of 
equity could enforce in favor of the widow and children." Id. at 100, It was indicated 
that the court felt that the contract was little more than an agreement to deal fairly with 
the son in the final disposition of the-father's estate. It appeared that this had been done. 
Provision actually made to the son's widow and children was more than ample to compen-
sate for the improvements the son made upon the land, and the land was devised to 
another son who had made improvements valued at about thirty-five times the value of 
the improvements made by the deceased son. This case is far from conclusive authority 
that the right of the promisee in a contract to devise is not descendible, and the opinion 
does not even refer to Estate of Leu, 172 Wis. 530, 179 N.W. 796 (1920), which, 
although relief was denied on other grounds, seemed to recognize the descendibility 0£ 
such a right as being beyond question. 
1s1 Chase v. Stevens, 34 Cal. App. 98, 166 P. 1035 (1917); Ochs v. Ochs, 122 N.J. 
Eq. 143, 192 A. 502 (1937); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924). 
1a2 Rosenberg v. Equitable Trust Co., (D.C. Del. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 991; Swingley 
v. Daniels, 123 Wash. 409, 212 P. 729 (1923). 
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As elsewhere in dealing with contracts to devise or bequeath, a few 
courts have allowed themselves to become confused by the peculiar 
notion that the will is an essential part of the machinery for getting 
the property to the promisee, and that it was the privilege of having 
a will made in his favor, rather than the right to have property pass 
to him at the death of the promisor, that was contracted for. This 
line of approach has led to the rather novel conclusion that since the 
promisor could have satisfied his obligation by making a will without 
anti-lapse provisions and that if the promisee had predeceased the 
promisor the legacy or devise would have lapsed, there is no basis for 
saying that the promisee had a descendible right.133 This conclusion 
can be easily answered by the more general proposition that a devise 
or bequest made in satisfaction of an obligation will not lapse.134 But 
a more satisfactory answer, and one which gets nearer the basic issues 
involved, is that the contract is for the right to have the property pass to 
the promisee at the death of the promisor, and that the will, as a 
means of accomplishing that result, is merely incidental. 
To rely upon the effect of anti-lapse provisions in a will or upon 
anti-lapse legislation as a basis for determining the descendibility of the 
right of the promisee is to ignore the fundamental nature of that right. 
Since it is a right created by contract the terms of the contract should 
be the guide to whether or not there is anything which can survive the 
death of the promisee. Of course if the contract is of such a nature that 
the promise was intended to be personal to the promisee there would 
be no reason to suppose that any obligation existed after the promisee's 
death prior to that of the promisor, 135 and it would seem that even 
1ss Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932) (taking the position that 
it was the contract, not the will, that was irrevocable, but that it was the will that passed 
the property); McDonald v. McDonald, 35 N.S.W. St. R. 173 (1935). See Bassett v. 
Salter, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 176 (1940), affd. 262 App. Div. 967, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 134 (1941) 
(apparently based on peculiar construction of the particular contract, however). 
134 Bacon v. Kiteley, 101 Colo. 559, 75 P. (2d) 590 (1938); Ballard v. Camplin, 
161 Ind. 16, 67 N.E. 505 (1903); Ward v. Bush, 59 N.J. Eq. 144, 45 A. 534 (1900); 
Stevens v. King, [1904] 2 Ch. 30. See McNeal v. Pierce, 73 Ohio St. 7 at 14-15, 75 N.E. 
938 (1905); l JARMAN, Wn.u:, 8th ed., 438 (1951); 4 PAGB, WILLS, 3d ed., §1417 
(1941) (recognizing the rule but questioning the soundness of its technical basis). 
So long as there is some doubt on the subject it might well be suggested as a precau-
tionary measure that an anti-lapse provision always be included in the contract. 
135 This was apparently the difficulty in Snyder v. Snyder, 77 Wis. 95, 45 N.W. 
818 (1890), where a son was to live on his father's fann and work it in a husbandlike 
manner and conduct himself like a good man in return for the promise of the father to 
devise him the farm. It was held that the death of the son prevented the carrying out of 
the contract as the parties intended. 
The doctrine has been applied where the provision which was to have been made 
was one to give the promisor' s son, the promisee, the option of buying certain property at 
a specified price after the promisor's death, if he chose to do so. Pershall v. Elliott, 249 
N.Y. 183, 163 N.E. 554 (1928). Where the promise is to will a child a fractional part of 
the estate but the transaction, when considered as a whole, indicates that the promise is 
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though anti-lapse legislation existed it would have no application unless 
the will were actually made and left in effect at the death of the testator. 
There is also the possibility that there could be a contract to devise to 
the promisee provided the situation at the promisor' s death were such 
that a devise to the promisee at that time would have any effect. In 
such a case the anti-lapse legislation would be material in determining 
whether or not the particular devise could be made, but here again it 
would be the contract that would be really controlling, and furthermore 
it is not likely that contracts can often be found with such terms. If 
any conditions precedent of this nature are included they are more 
likely to be that the promisee or some other specified person survive 
the promisor than they are to be that there be anti-lapse legislation in 
existence. In any event where the contract makes provision for the 
eventuality of the promisee's dying first no problem arises.136 The real 
question is raised in cases where there is an ordinary contract to devise 
or bequeath with no express provision as to what will happen in case 
the promisee is the first to die, and the promisee, after completely 
performing his part of the contract:137 dies prior to the death of the 
promisor. The promisee in such a case has earned the right to have the 
property pass to him. Only the time is postponed. There is no reason 
nothing more than that the child will not be disinherited, the promise is personal to the 
child, and the obligation created by it terminates with the child's death. Bomar v. Car-
stairs, 124 Tex. 492, 79 S.W. (2d) 841 (1935). 
186 The contracts actually coming before the courts rarely ever contain such express 
provisions, but much of the difficulty could always be avoided if they did. A good example 
of a simple means of avoiding doubt as to the intention of the parties is found in Burdine 
v. Burdine's Torr., 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900), where there was a contract to will 
certain property to the promisee and an alternative provision to will certain other property 
in the event the promisee predeceased the promiser. 
137 Whether or not the contract can be enforced where the promisee dies before com-
plete performance would seem to depend upon whether or not the performance to be ren-
dered by the promisee was of such a personal nature as to make it impossible for the heir 
or personal representative to perform in his stead. Where the consideration to be rendered 
consists of care and support, an offer to perform by the heir and administrator is sufficient 
to give them a right to enforce the contract. Torgerson v. Hauge, 34 N.D. 646, 159 N.W. 
6 (1916). Even where the consideration to be rendered consists in part of the society and 
companionship of the particular individual concerned, it has been suggested that his death 
does nothing more than give the promiser a right to rescind, and that if he fails to exercise 
that right but continues to receive performance from the successor in interest without 
giving notice of his election to rescind within a reasonable time, he is bound by his promise. 
See Prater v. Prater, 94 S.C. 267 at 280, 77 S.E. 936 (1912) (relief denied, however, 
because the successor in interest actually breached the contract before the death of the 
promisor). Where full performance has become impossible because of his death prior to 
that of the promiser, the successor in interest has been permitted to recover for the per-
formance actually rendered. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 Mo. App. 18 (1892). Where the per-
formance yet to be done by the promisee consisted of paying over of money at the death of 
the promiser the promisee's devisee was entitled to specific performance upon tender of the 
money in Ochs v. Ochs, 122 N.J. Eq. 143, 192 A. 502 (1937). 
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why his early death should work a forfeiture.138 The courts recognizing 
the right of the promisee as being descendible to his heirs, although 
usually found in states where anti-lapse legislation would have taken 
care of the matter if the will had been made, rarely ever mention such 
legislation in their analysis of the problem but rather base their deci-
sions solely upon the survival of a right arising out of contract.139 The 
promisee may by will dispose of his interest to the one other than those 
who would take a lapsed gift under an anti-lapse statute.140 If the 
promisee assigns his interest and then predeceases the promisor the 
assignee may enforce the contract even though he is not one to whom 
the anti-lapse statutes would have given property devised to the promi-
see.141 In jurisdictions recognizing dower in equitable interests the 
wife of the predeceased promisee is given dower in his interest under 
the contract, a result not provided for in the anti-lapse statutes.142 It 
seems that the only effect of discussions of lapse legislation in this con-
nection is to confuse unnecessarily the substantive rights of the parties 
with the vehicle by which they intended to achieve those rights, and, 
where followed, to work an obvious injustice in almost every case where 
the promisee predeceases the promisor. 
This erroneous conception of the will as an essential part of the 
process of getting the property to the promisee has led to a few rather 
questionable decisions in still other situations. If the will is thought of 
as an essential part of the mechanism, it would seem logical that the 
promisee would have some right to have the will executed. Although 
an affirmative injunction to that effect has been sought,143 no case has 
been found where such relief has been actually granted. The promisor 
has been enjoined from making a will other than in compliance with 
the contract,144 and once a will has been made carrying out the provi-
138 "The performance by Andrew [the promisee] was complete until his death. The 
contract did not specify that his death should forfeit all rights of his heirs or estate obtained 
under such performance. Equity should not imply or construe such a forfeiture where none 
has been stipulated. In fact every equity and circumstance is in favor of enforcement of 
the contract •••• " Torgerson v. Hauge, 34 N.D. 646 at 659, 159 N.W. 6 (1916). 
139 Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 269 N.W. 883 (1936); Kisor v. Litzenberg, 
203 Iowa 1183, 212 N.W. 343 (1927); Moore's Admr. v. Wagers' Admr., 243 Ky. 351, 
48 S.W. (2d) 15 (1932); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 Mo. App. 18 (1892); Torgerson v. Hauge, 
34 N.D. 646, 159 N.W. 6 (1916). 
140 Ochs v. Ochs, 122 N.J. Eq. 143, 192 A. 502 (1937). 
141 Rosenberg v. Equitable Trust Co., (D.C. Del. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 991. 
142 See Young v. Young, 45 N.J. Eq. 27 at 36, 16 A. 921 (1889). For a treatment 
of the law as to dower in equitable interests see 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §5.23 
(1952). 
148 Stone v. Burgeson, 215 Ala. 23, 109 S. 155 (1926). 
144 Duvale v. Duvale, 54 N.J. Eq. 581, 35 A. 750 (1896), modified and affd. 56 N.J. 
Eq. 375, 39 A. 687, 40 A. 440 (1898). 
36 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
sions of the contract, its revocation has been enjoined.145 It is doubtful 
if either of these decrees could have any substantial effect on the rights 
of the parties. Either decree could have been violated in secret, and 
if such had taken place there is no clue as to any action that could have 
been taken after the death of the violator. Neither is there any clear 
indication that the rights of the promisee would have been affected by 
the compliance or noncompliance with the injunction. In case of the 
injunction against making a will other than in compliance with the 
contract, if the promisor made no will at all it would have been neces-
sary to .proceed against his heirs and next of kin after his death. There 
is no reason to believe that such a procedure would have had any 
advantage over a proceeding against the beneficiaries of an inconsistent 
will. In the case of the injunction against revocation, a revocation of 
the will would not have affected the prornisee' s rights under the con-
tract which could have been enforced against volunteers, whether heirs 
or devisees. That this is true is clearly demonstrated by the numerous 
instances where the right of the prornisee to the property is enforced, 
whether the action is brought before or after the death of the promisor, 
without regard to whether any will was ever executed.146 
The only conceivable advantage of such injunctions during the 
lifetime of the promisor would appear to be the moral restraint they 
might impose upon him. But since the prornisee will have the same 
rights whether the promisor complies with the injunction or not, no 
145 Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N.E. 528, rehearing den. 87 Ind. App. 
52, 157 N.E. 104 (1927). One court has granted the prayer of the promisee for a declara-
tory judgment that a will executed pursuant to contract was irrevocable. Stewart v. Shelton, 
356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W. (2d) 395 (1947). 
146 Citation of authority here seems inappropriate. Practically the whole body of liti-
gation arising out of contracts to devise or bequeath arises out of the failure of the promisor 
to leave an effective will complying with the terms of the contract. If the existence of the 
will were an essential part of the machinery for getting the property to the promisee, the 
contract would tend to become ineffective and the law for enforcement where no will is 
made would be nullified. A few of the many cases enforcing the transfer of property with-
out the aid of a will may be mentioned. Keefe v. Keefe, 19 Cal. App. 310, 125 P. 929 
(1912) (contract was merely that the promisee should receive the property, the means by 
which he was to receive it not being specified and apparently not important); Chehak v. 
Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N.W. 330 (1907); Anderson v, Anderson, 75 Kan. 117, 88 
P. 743 (1907); Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30, 60 N.E. 415 (1901); Laird v. Vila, 93 
Minn. 45, 100 N.W. 656 (1904); Crinkley v. Rogers, 100 Neb. 647, 160 N.W. 974 
(1916); Matter of Stevens, 192 Misc. 179, 78 N.Y.S. (2d) 868 (1948) (will gave only 
part of property contracted for, but it was held that beneficiary took all through the con-
tract); Kelley v. Devin, 65 Ore. 211, 132 P. 535 (1913) (will gave property to third 
person); Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N.W. 801 (1934) (will gave property to third 
person). 
Even though there is a will made pursuant to the contract the promisee may rest his 
title upon the contract rather than taking through the will. Legro v. Kelley, 311 Mass. 674, 
42 N.E. (2d) 836 (1942). 
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reason appears why even the moral restraint, however strong it might 
be, is of very great advantage. Where there is danger that the promisor 
is going to attempt to avoid his contract it is advantageous to have the 
existence of the contract litigated prior to his death because of the diffi-
culties the promisee might face thereafter under the statutes restricting 
one's right to testify concerning his transactions with a dead person.147 
This advantage could be achieved through what appears to be the more 
appropriate remedy of an action to preserve his rights to the property. 
A further question which suggests itself is whether or not the right 
of the promisee to receive property upon the death of the promisor is 
such a right as may be levied upon by the creditors of the promisee prior 
to the promisor's death. In the only case that has been found in which 
the courts have answered that question directly, the answer was in the 
negative.148 The case involved a joint will executed by a husband and 
wife by which each of them gave his or her estate to the survivor, and 
the survivor disposed of his or her estate in a certain manner. There 
was a contract that the survivor would not change his will. After the 
death of the wife one of the beneficiaries who was given certain real 
estate and also a proportionate share in the residue became bankrupt, 
and the trustee in bankruptcy attempted to include the beneficiary's 
interest arising out of the contract in the bankrupt's estate. In denying 
the trustee access to that interest the court relied upon the theory that 
(I) a will has no effect until death, and (2) the parties to the contract 
did not intend that the beneficiary shoulq have an alienable interest prior 
to the death of the surviving parent. The first objection can be dis-
missed as being completely without merit when it is noted that the 
trustee was seeking no interest under a will but rather an interest under 
a contract. The second objection is little more than an illustration of a 
further confusion of contractual and testamentary acts. The court 
stated," ... I am constrained to the conclusion that it was not the testa-
mentary intent that any alienable interest in the estate should pass . . . 
until the death of the surviving parent."149 It should have been clear 
that no question of testamentary intent was involved since no interest 
under a will was being asserted. The matter in issue concerned an 
interest created by contract. If that interest had been defined, the law 
dealing with its incidents could have been applied to determine its 
alienability.150 Another argument used to support the decision was to 
147Winchell v. Mixter, 316 Mich. 151, 25 N.W. (2d) 147 (1946). 
148 Jn re Lage, (D.C. Iowa 1927) 19 F. (2d) 153. 
149 Id. at 154. 
150 This is a good illustration of the confusion often caused by joint wills. In this case 
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the effect that the beneficiary could renounce the devise or bequest and 
thereby defeat the title of any possible purchaser even though the 
trustee should be permitted to sell the interest in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. It is doubtful if this is a valid argument, for although a 
beneficiary of a will ordinarily does have the privilege of renouncing a 
testamentary gift with impunity regardless of his creditors,151 no case 
has been found sustaining his privilege to renounce and defeat the 
rights of his assignee where he has for a consideration assigned his 
rights under a contract to devise or bequeath. There is no reason why 
the assignee in bankruptcy should be in any less favorable position in 
this respect than the assignee of a voluntary assignment. Since most 
courts recognize the interest created by a contract to make a will as 
being a right of the promisee ( or third party beneficiary) to have the 
property of the promisor How to him at the promisor' s death, and since 
this right is generally recognized as alienable, descendible, and devis-
able, the soundness of the decision in the case under discussion may 
well be questioned, and its value as a precedent doubted. 
To be concluded. 
the wills of two persons, together with a contract between them (the evidence of the 
contract was meager, but the court experienced no difficulty with that part of the case) were 
expressed in one instrument. The court treated it all as one instrument without any clear 
separation of the will of the wife from the will of the husband or separation of either of 
the wills from the contract. 
151 Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); Tarr v. Robinson, 
158 Pa. 60, 27 A. 859 (1893). 
